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Abstract
Dynamic discrete choice models often discretize the state vector and restrict its dimension
in order to achieve valid inference. I propose a novel two-stage estimator for the set-identified
structural parameter that incorporates a high-dimensional state space into the dynamic model
of imperfect competition. In the first stage, I estimate the state variable’s law of motion and the
equilibrium policy function using machine learning tools. In the second stage, I plug the first-
stage estimates into a moment inequality and solve for the structural parameter. The moment
function is presented as the sum of two components, where the first one expresses the equilibrium
assumption and the second one is a bias correction term that makes the sum insensitive (i.e.,
Neyman-orthogonal) to first-stage bias. The proposed estimator uniformly converges at the
root-N rate and I use it to construct confidence regions. The results developed here can be
used to incorporate high-dimensional state space into classic dynamic discrete choice models,
for example, those considered in Rust (1987), Bajari et al. (2007), and Scott (2013).
1 Introduction
In empirical work on dynamic models, economists often make specification choices - for exam-
ple, discretize state space or select covariates for flow utility - in order to achieve computational
tractability and precise estimates (e.g. Pakes and Schankerman (1984), Pakes (1986), Rust (1987),
Ryan (2012)). Typically, economists have little intuition about which covariates to select or how
to discretize a continuous state variable (Lanjouw et al. (1998)). Unfortunately, counterfactual
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predictions of dynamic models are sensitive to specification choices and are difficult to interpret
when a model is misspecified. As discussed in Athey (2017), there has been recent interest in data-
driven model selection based on modern machine learning tools. Moreover, (Belloni et al. (2016),
Chernozhukov et al. (2017a), Chernozhukov et al. (2017b), Wager and Athey (2016)) have shown
how to leverage these tools into high-quality estimates of causal parameters. Because dynamic
models are more challenging to analyze, the model selection in dynamic models remains an open
question.
This paper estimates a dynamic model of imperfect competition with a high-dimensional state
space. Consider the bus engine replacement model from Rust (1987) as a special case. An agent
decides whether to replace the bus engine in each period. The agent incurs a fixed cost in the case
of replacement and a cost proportional to the current mileage in the case of maintenance. One
can imagine that the future bus mileage depends on a vector of observed exogenous characteristics,
such as current traffic and weather conditions, encoded in a high-dimensional vector. While these
characteristics do not enter into the per-period utility of the owner, they affect the mileage’s law of
motion in the case of maintenance decision, and hence are taken into account in the agent’s optimal
renewal policy. Therefore, the expected value of bus ownership depends on a high-dimensional
state vector consisting of the current mileage and exogenous characteristics. I am interested in
the identified set of the possible values of the cost parameters that are rationalized by the agent’s
optimal behavior. In addition to the model in Rust (1987), the methods developed here apply to
a broad variety of dynamic models: for example, those considered in Bajari et al. (2007) or Scott
(2013), etc. that point´ or partially identify their parameters under various assumptions about
the agent’s optimal behavior.
The main difficulty of this approach is estimating the value function. The plug-in (naive)
approach of Bajari et al. (2007) consists of two steps. In the first step, one estimates the state vari-
able’s law of motion and the equilibrium policy function, effectively recovering agents’ equilibrium
beliefs. In the second step, one estimates the value function by drawing a sequence of states and
actions from the conditional distributions estimated in the first step and averaging over multiple
simulation draws. If the state variable is high-dimensional, we must regularize the estimate of the
first-stage parameter in order to achieve consistency in high dimension. An inherent cost of these
methods is bias that converges slower than parametric rate. As a result, first-stage bias carries over
into the second stage, resulting in a low-quality estimate of the identified set.
The major challenge of this paper is to overcome transmitting the bias from the first to the
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second stage. A basic idea, proposed in a point-identified case, is to make the moment equation
insensitive, or, formally, Neyman-orthogonal, to the biased estimation of the first-stage parameter
(Neyman (1959),Chernozhukov et al. (2017a)). The second idea consists in the use of different
samples to estimate the equilibrium beliefs at the first stage and to compute the sample average
of the bias correction term at the second stage. Using different samples in the first and the second
stages allows me to employ modern machine learning methods to estimate the first stage parameters.
The first contribution of this paper is to derive a Neyman-orthogonal moment for the value
function. This equation is presented as the sum of two terms, where the first term is the value
function itself and the second term is a bias correction term that makes the sum insensitive (i.e.,
Neyman-orthogonal) to the first-stage bias. To derive the bias correction term, I characterize
the value function as a solution to the recursive (Bellman) equation, which equates the expected
value at the current state to the sum of expected immediate payoff and the expected discounted
future payoff. This equation can be viewed as a semiparametric moment equation, where the
parametric component gives the value function’s moment (i.e., weighted average) and the nuisance
parameter consists of the first-stage parameters appearing in the value function (i.e., conditional
choice probability and state variable’s law of motion). The first-stage parameter appears both inside
and outside the value function. For example, the conditional probability of a given choice appears
as a weight on immediate and discounted future payoffs corresponding to that choice. Applying
the implicit function theorem to this equation, I derive the bias correction term and show how to
approximate it by simulation. This derivation is novel: this is the first result in the literature that
derives the bias correction term for a moment function that is not available in the closed form.
The second contribution of this paper is to extend the general theory of moment inequalities
proposed by Chernozhukov et al. (2007) to allow for moment functions that depend on a first-stage
nuisance parameter that can be high-dimensional (e.g., conditional choice probability). I character-
ize the identified set as the minimizer of the criterion function that penalizes the incorrect sign of
the moment inequality (e.g., the sign that contradicts the optimality assumption). I show that, if
the moment function is insensitive with respect to the biased estimation of its nuisance parameter
at each point of the space of the structural parameter, plugging in the first-stage estimate of the
nuisance parameter into the moment function delivers a high-quality sample criterion function. In
particular, the estimator of the identified set obtained by inverting the sample criterion function
converges at the same rate as if the true value of the first-stage nuisance parameter were known.
Furthermore, inferential statistics based on the estimated moment function have a non-degenerate
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large sample distribution and are used to construct confidence regions for the identified set by
subsampling.
This paper leaves a number of open questions. First, this article assumes that the first-
stage nuisance parameter is identified. This assumption does not hold for every application (e.g.,
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009)). Second, the high-dimensional state space introduces a wealth of fea-
sible suboptimal Markov policies to choose from for the construction of moment inequalities. In this
paper I take the set of chosen alternatives as given, leaving the optimal choice of these alternatives
for future research.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the results. Section
3 gives the low-level sufficient conditions for the dynamic discrete choice model in Bajari et al.
(2007). Section 4 presents an asymptotic theory for the identified sets defined by the semiparametric
moment inequalities.
1.1 Literature review
This paper is built on three lines of work: estimation and inference in partially identified models
and Neyman-orthogonal semiparametric estimation.
The first line of research, see e.g. Rosen (2006), Chernozhukov et al. (2007), Romano and Shaikh
(2010) develops a framework for the estimation and inference of identified sets that are partially
identified by moment inequalities. Extending this framework, Kaido and White (2014) allow the
moment function to depend on an identified low-dimensional first-stage parameter in addition to
the target. Furthermore, I allow the first-stage parameter to be a high-dimensional vector or a
highly complex function and estimate it by modern machine learning methods.
Within the first line of my research, my application is most connected to the estimation of dy-
namic models of imperfect competition. Specifically, I build on Bajari et al. (2007) who identifies
the structural parameter as a solution to a set of moment inequalities that embody the assumptions
about the agent’s optimal behavior. This paper proposed a two-stage algorithm to estimate the
parameter, where in the first-stage one estimates the state variables’s law of motion and equilib-
rium policy function, and then plugs them into a moment equation derived from the equilibrium
assumption. However, to achieve valid inference, Bajari et al. (2007) imposed parametric restric-
tions in the first stage. Extending this algorithm, I drop these restrictions and estimate first-stage
parameters by machine learning methods.
The second line of research (Ibgragimov and Hasminskii (1981),Andrews (1994), Newey (1994),
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van der Vaart (1998)) is concerned with obtaining a root-N consistent and asymptotically nor-
mal estimate for a low-dimensional target parameter in the presence of a nuisance parameter. In
this literature, a two-stage statistical procedure is insensitive, or, formally, Neyman-orthogonal,
to the estimation error of the first-stage parameter (Neyman (1959)). Extending the orthogo-
nality idea from a parametric to semiparametric setup was done in Newey (1994), Robins et al.
(1994), Robins and Rotnitzky (1995). Combining Neyman-orthogonality and sample splitting,
Chernozhukov et al. (2017a) and Chernozhukov et al. (2017b) incorporated modern machine learn-
ing methods to estimate low-dimensional target parameters defined by semiparametric moment
equations. Subsequently, the idea has been extended to the case of high-dimensional target pa-
rameter in Chernozhukov et al. (2017c) and Chernozhukov et al. (2018). This paper translates the
idea of Neyman-orthogonality from point- to set-identified case.
Within the second line research, my application is most connected to the estimation of dy-
namic discrete choice models under point-identification (Bajari et al. (2010), Bajari et al. (2015),
Arcidiacono et al. (2013), Chernozhukov et al. (2017b)). Specifically, Chernozhukov et al. (2017b)
introduces high-dimensional state space into a dynamic discrete choice model whose choice set
contains a renewal choice and derives a Neyman-orthogonal moment equation for the structural
parameter in that model. In this paper, I address the cases that do not have renewal choice property
and derive the Neyman-orthogonal moment equation for the value function directly. This result is
applicable to both point- and set-identified cases with discrete and continuous choice sets.
2 Set-Up and Motivation
I am interested in an identified set defined by moment inequalities
ΘI :“ tθ : EmpD, θ, η0q ď 0u, (1)
whereD is the data vector distributed as PD, θ is the parameter of interest, and η is an identified yet
unknown parameter of the distribution PD whose true value is η0. For example, in the bus engine
replacement model of (Rust (1987)) the parameter of interest, θ, is a vector of operational and
replacement costs, the data vector D contains bus mileage and other observed bus characteristics,
η contains mileage’s law of motion and the conditional probabilities of bus replacement, and the
inequality restriction comes from the assumption that agent behaves optimally. I allow the state
variable, w , to be high dimensional and estimate the parameter η by modern machine learning
methods.
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The examples below demonstrate how a high-dimensional state w may appear in the dynamic
discrete choice model.
Example 1. Engine Replacement Model from Rust (1987) with a High-Dimensional
State Variable A single agent makes a binary decision a P A “ t0, 1u whether to replace a bus
engine in each period t P t1, 2, . . . ,8u. His per-period utility function is
πpa, s, ǫq “
$’&
’%
´R` ǫp0q, a “ 0,
´µ ¨ s` ǫp1q, a “ 1,
(2)
where s P R is the bus mileage, R is replacement costs, µs is operational cost, a is the decision
of the agent, and ǫ “ pǫp0q, ǫp1qq is a vector of private shocks associated with each decision. The
state variable w consists of the mileage s and additional high-dimensional vector of exogenous
variables x (e.g., engine manufacturer characteristics) that I assume do not change with time.
After the replacement decision pa “ 0q the mileage snext resets to 1 with probability one. After the
maintenance decision pa “ 1q, the mileage snext follows a first-order Markov process
snext “ ρ0pwq ` e, e „ Np0, 1q, (3)
where ρ0pwq is the conditional expectation function of the mileage tomorrow snext given the state
today w and e „ Np0, 1q is an independent Np0, 1q shock. The target parameter θ “ pR,µq
consists of the replacement and operational cost parameters. The observed data vector consists of
the current state, action, and future state (i.e, D “ pw, a,wnextq). Under the assumptions discussed
below, the unknown yet identified high-dimensional parameters consist of the conditional choice
probability γpwq “ Ppa “ 1|wq and the transition function ρpwq.
Example 2. Entry Game with a Long-Lived and a Short-Lived Player
In each period t P t1, 2, . . . ,8u Apple decides whether to issue a new model of a phone paApple “
0q or keep the existing one paApple “ 1q. In addition to Apple, a short-lived potential entrant (Player
2) decides whether to issue a fake paP “ 1q or not paP “ 0q. Each period Apple faces a new copy
of player 2. Player 2’s actions do not influence the motion of the state, and he has no dynamic
incentives. In each period both players observe a state vector w “ ps, xq that consists of the age of
the current make s and the vector x of short-lived player’s characteristics (e.g., country, information
about intellectual property rights protection) that does not change with time (i.e, xt “ x0).
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In each period both players receive a privately observed shock. Apple’s utility function is given
by
πpa,w, ǫq “
$’&
’%
´R` δ1aP ` ǫp0q, aApple “ 0,
´µ ¨ s` δ2aP ` ǫp1q, aApple “ 1,
(4)
where R is the fixed cost of replacing the current model with a new one, ´µ ¨s is the profit from the
current make that decays with age, and ǫ “ pǫp0q, ǫp1qq is a vector of Apple’s shocks associated with
each decision. After the replacement decision paApple “ 1q the age snext resets to 1 with probability
one. After the maintenance decision paApple “ 2q the age snext increases by 1 with probability 1
snext “ s` 1.
The target parameter θ “ pR,µ, δ1 ´ δ0q consists of the cost parameters and the difference
between the interaction parameters δ1 ´ δ0. The observed data vector D “ pw, a,wnextq consists
of the current state, w, action profile a “ paApple, aP q, and the future state, wnext. Under the
assumptions discussed below, the unknown yet identified high-dimensional parameters consist of the
conditional choice probability of both players: γApwq “ PpaApple “ 1|wq and γP pwq :“ PpaP “ 1|wq.
Consider the setting of Example 1. I assume that the agent follows a Markov policy σpw, ǫq that
maps the current state w PW Ă Rdw and the shock vector ǫ P R2 into the action space A “ t0, 1u.
The value function V pw; θ;σq of a Markov policy σ is given by
V pw; θ;σq “ Er
8ÿ
t“0
βtπpσpwt, ǫtq, wt, ǫtq|ws,
where β ă 1 is a discount factor. This function can also be written recursively:
V pw; θ;σq “ Eǫ
“
πpσpw, ǫq, w, ǫpσpw, ǫqqq ` βErV pwnext; θ;σq|w, σpw, ǫqs
‰
, (5)
where the first and second summands show the expected current profit and the future expected
discounted value, respectively. Define the choice-specific value function as
vpa,wq :“ ´R0p1´ aq ` p´µ0sqa` βErV pwnext; θ0;σ˚q|w, a “ 0sp1 ´ aq
` βErV pwnext; θ0;σ˚q|w, a “ 1sa, a P A,
where the current deterministic utility is evaluated at the action a and the future discounted value
is evaluated at the optimal strategy σ˚, conditional on the current action a. The symbols pR0, µ0q
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stand for the true values of the cost parameters. The choice a is optimal if and only if its total
utility is greater than or equal to the utility of any other choice a1 P A:
vpa,wq ` ǫpaq ě vpa1, wq ` ǫpa1q, a1 P A.
Then the optimal Markov policy σ˚pw, ǫq has a cutoff form:
σ˚pw, ǫq “
$’&
’%
1, ǫp1q ´ ǫp0q ě ´vp1, wq ` vp0, wq
0, otherwise.
(6)
To identify the difference pvp1, wq ´ vp0, wqq I make the following standard assumption (e.g.,
Hotz and Miller (1993), Scott (2013)) that I will maintain throughout the paper. In general case,
the model will involve several players K. Denote their choice sets by Ak, k P t1, 2, . . . ,Ku.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Independent logit errors). The components of the private shock vector ǫ “
tpǫkpjqqjPAkuKk“1 P E are identically and independently distributed with a type 1 extreme value
distribution whose distribution function is equal to F ptq “ expp´ expp´tqq.
As discussed in Hotz and Miller (1993), the vector of differences of the choice-specific value
functions can be expressed as
vpa1, wq ´ vp1, wq “ log Ppa1|wq
Pp1|wq “ log
γ0pwq
1´ γ0pwq , (7)
where γ0pwq “ Ppa “ 1|wq is the probability of the decision to maintain the engine conditional on
the state w which is identified. For expositional purpose, I consider a simple suboptimal Markov
policy: the choice of the decision based on the coin toss:
Epσpw, ǫq “ 1|wq “ 1
2
. (8)
Combining 6 and 7, I recognize that the optimal strategy can be viewed as a function of γ:
σ˚pw, ǫq “ σ˚pw, ǫ, γq
Therefore, value function V pw; θ;σ˚q can be viewed as the function of γ.
Define the moment function mpw, θ, γq as the difference of the value function evaluated for the
suboptimal and the optimal strategies
mpw, θ, γq :“ V pw; θ;σ; γq ´ V pw; θ;σ˚; γq. (9)
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Define the identified set ΘI as
ΘI :“ Ermpw, θ, γ0qs ď 0.
Because σ˚ is an optimal strategy, the inequality above holds for the true parameter θ0, and ΘI is
a valid identified set.
2.1 Naive Approach to the Estimation of the Identified Set
The functionmpw, θ, ηq given in (9) presents two complications. First, the value function V pw; θ;σ; ηq
depends on the unknown nuisance parameter η. Second, even if the value of η is given, the value
function is not readily available in the closed form and must be approximated by simulation. Here
I focus on the first complication as if the moment function were readily available, leaving the
description of the simulation algorithm for Section 3.
A possible, though naive estimator of the value function can be constructed as follows. Consider
an ideal scenario where the researcher knows mileage’s law of motion. Then the choice probability γ
is the only unknown nuisance parameter that appears in the value function. Given an i.i.d sample
pDiqNi“1 from the law PD, it is split into a main sample J2 and an auxiliary sample J1 of equal
size n “ rN{2s such that J1 \ J2 “ t1, 2, . . . , Nu. After that, the estimator of the value function
V pw; θ;σ˚; γq is constructed as the sample average:
pV pw; θ;σ˚; pγq :“ 1|J2|
ÿ
iPJ2
V pwi; θ;σ˚; pγpwiqq,
where pγ is estimated on the auxiliary sample J1. Unfortunately, for some parameter values θ P Θ
this estimator has slower than
?
N convergence:
?
N |pV pw; θ;σ˚; pγq ´ EV pw; θ;σ˚; γ0q| Ñ 8. (10)
Therefore, the estimator pΘI of the identified set ΘI based on the moment function (9) has subop-
timal convergence rates.
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The source of the slow convergence (10) can be understood through the following decomposition:
?
NppV pw; θ;σ˚; pγq ´ pV pw; θ;σ˚; γ0qq “ ?NpErV pwi; θ;σ˚; γ0qs ´ 1|J2|
ÿ
iPJ2
V pwi; θ;σ˚; γ0qqlooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
a
`
?
NErV pwi; θ;σ˚; pγq ´ V pwi; θ;σ˚; γ0qslooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooon
b
`
?
Np 1|J2|
ÿ
iPJ2
V pwi; θ;σ˚; pγq ´ EV pwi; θ;σ˚; pγqqlooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
c
.
The term a is the centered sample average of the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; γ0q evaluated at the
true value γ0 of the choice probability. Due to the sample splitting, the term c is a centered sample
average of conditional on J1 i.i.d random variables and is well-behaved. The term b stands for
the bias of the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; pγq coming from the biased estimation of the conditional
choice probability γ. This term is responsible for the slow convergence (10).
The divergence of b comes from the combination of two facts: biased estimation of the first stage
and the transmission of the bias from the first to the second stage. Since the conditional choice
probability γpwq is a function of a high-dimensional state vector w, bias of its machine learning
estimate (e.g., ℓ1-regularized logistic regression) converges slower than root-N . Because the value
function V pw; θ;σ˚; γq is sensitive to this bias, it carries over into the second stage.
Overcoming the Regularization Bias using Orthogonalization. To overcome the transla-
tion of the first stage bias into the second stage I add the bias correction term to the value function
V pw; θ;σ˚; γq to make it insensitive with respect to the biased estimation of γ. The new moment
function for the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; γq takes the form
gpD; θ;σ˚; γq :“ V pw; θ;σ˚; γq ` 1
1´ βΓpw; θqp1a“1 ´ γpwqq,
where the function Γpw; θq for θ “ pR,µq is
Γpw; θq :“ ´µs`R` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 1s (11)
´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 0s ´ 2
γpwq ´ log
γpwq
1´ γpwq .
Because the bias correction term has zero mean
Er 1
1´ βΓpw; θqp1a“1 ´ γ0pwqqs “
1
1´ βEwΓpw; θqErp1a“1 ´ γ0pwqq|ws “ 0, θ P Θ,
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the new moment function can replace the old one in the definition of the identified set. Moreover,
the new function is insensitive to the bias estimation of γ. As a result, under additional mild
regularity conditions, the regularization bias of the choice probability pγpwq does not translate into
the bias of the moment function:
?
N |EgpD, θ, pγq ´ gpD, θ, γ0qs| Ñ 0.
The Role of Sample Splitting in Preventing Overfitting. Another key aspect of the pro-
posed analysis is using different samples J1 and J2 for different stages of estimating the value
function. Had I used the whole sample to estimate the conditional choice probability pγpwq, the
sample average
1
N
Nÿ
i“1
gpDi, θ, pγq ´ ErgpDi, θ, pγqs
would not be a sample average of the i.i.d (or weakly dependent) random observations. The relation
between the first stage error pγpwiq´γ0pwiq and the value of the moment function gpDi, θ, γ0q creates
bias, referred to as overfitting bias. To control the overfitting bias in the worst-case scenario:
E sup
γPG
|
Nÿ
i“1
pgpDi, θ, γq ´ gpDi, θ, γ0qq ´ ErgpDi, θ, γq ´ gpDi, θ, γ0qs|,
one must impose complexity constraints on the class of functions G that are used to estimate the
conditional choice probability. While some nonparametric estimators designed for low-dimensional
state spaces obey these constraints, some modern machine learning estimators designed for high-
dimensional state variables do not. To accommodate machine learning estimators at the first stage,
I use different samples.
Bias Correction Terms for Examples 1 and 2 . Suppose a nuisance parameter can be
presented as a conditional expectation ErU |ws. Then bias correction term for conditional choice
probability takes the form
αpD; θ; ξq “ Πpw; θqpU ´ ErU |wsq,
where ξ is an unknown vector-valued function of the state variable w. The true value ξ0 “ ξ0pθq
consists of the original conditional expectation function ErU |ws and the function Πpw; θq
ξ0pθq :“ tErU |ws,Πp¨, θqu. (12)
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Remark 1 (Example 1, continued). Consider the setup in Example 1. The nuisance parameter
η “ pγ, ρq consists of the conditional choice probability γ and the transition function ρ defined in
(3). The transition function ρ is present in the value function evaluated for the optimal σ˚ and the
suboptimal σ strategies. The conditional choice probability enters V pw; θ;σ˚; ηq only through the
optimal strategy σ˚, described in (6)-(7). To sum up, the bias correction term for Example 1 is
αpD; θ; ξq “ αTRANSσ pD; θ; ξq ´ αTRANSσ˚ pD; θ; ξq ´ αCCP pD; θ; γq, (13)
where e.g., αTRANSσ pD; θ; ξq is the individual bias correction term for ρ for the case of suboptimal
strategy σ.
As discussed above, the bias correction term αCCP pD; θ; γq that corrects the bias of the condi-
tional choice probability γ0 is
αCCP pD; θ; γq “ 1
1´ βΓpw; θqp1ta“1u ´ γpwqq, (14)
where the function Γpw, θq is given in (11). The form for the bias correction term for the transition
function ρ is the same regardless whether σ is optimal or not. Let σ˜ P tσ, σ˚u be a Markov policy.
Suppose the state vector w has a stationary distribution. Then the bias correction term of the value
function V pw; θ;σ; ηq for the transition function ρp¨q is equal to:
αTRANSσ˜ pD; θ; ξq :“
β
1´ βEr
dV px; θ; σ˜; η0q
dx
|x“wnext |w, a “ 1spsnext ´ ρpwqq, (15)
where ξ is an unknown vector-valued function of the state variable w. Its true value ξ0 “ ξ0pθq
consists of the original nuisance parameter η0 and the function Π0pw, θq:
Π0pw, θq :“ ErdV px; θ;σ; η0q
dx
|x“wnext |ws,
which is equal to the expectation of the derivative of the value function with respect to the state
variable evaluated for the future state conditional on the current state w.
The bias correction term for other suboptimal Markov policies is more complicated, but can be
derived using the argument of Appendix 5.
Remark 2 (Example 2, continued). Consider the setup in Example 2. The nuisance parameter
η “ pγA, γP q consists of the conditional choice probabilities of Apple and Player 2. The choice
probability γA enters the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; ηq only through the optimal strategy σ˚, described
in (6)-(7). The choice probability γP enters the value function V pw; θ; σ˜; ηq, σ˜ P tσ˚, σu. To sum
up, the bias correction term for Example 1 is equal to:
αpD; θ; ηq :“ ´αCCPA pD; θ; γq ` ασP pD; θ; γP q ´ ασ
˚
P pD; θ; γP q,
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where e.g. αCCPA pD; θ; γq is the individual bias correction term for γA.
Let σ˜ P tσ, σ˚u be a Markov policy. Suppose the state vector w has a stationary distribution.
Then the bias correction term of the value function V pw; θ;σ; ηq for the γP is equal to:
ασP pD; θ; γP q :“ Γσ˜P pw; θqp1taP“1u ´ γP pwqq,
where
Γσ˜P pw; θq “
1
1´ β pδ0 ` pδ1 ´ δ0qγ
σ˜pwqq,
where γσ˜pwq “ Ppσ˜pw, ǫq “ 1|wq is the conditional probability of Apple’s decision under the policy
σ˜. The bias correction term for Apple’s conditional choice probability γA is
αCCPA pD; θ; γq “ ´µs`R` pδ1 ´ δ0qγApwq ` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; η0q|w, a “ 1s
´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; η0q|w, a “ 0s.
To sum up, the bias correction term αpD; θ; ηq is equal to:
αpD; θ; ηq :“ ´αCCPA pD; θ; γq `
1
1´ β pδ1 ´ δ0qpγ
σ
0 pwq ´ γA,0pwqqp1taP“1u ´ γP pwqq.
In some point-identified problems the value function V pw; θ;σ; ηq is only evaluated at the opti-
mal strategy σ˚ and the true parameter value θ0. Then the bias correction term is evaluated only
at the true value θ0. In particular, in the Examples 1 and 2 the function Γpw, θ0q can be further
simplified as follows:
Γpw, θ0q “ ´µ0s`R0 ` βErV pwnext; θ0;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 1s ´ βErV pwnext; θ0;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 0sloooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
vp1,wq´vp0,wq
´ 2
γpwq ´ log
γpwq
1´ γpwq
“ log γpwq
1´ γpwq ` p´
2
γpwq ´ log
γpwq
1´ γpwq q
“ ´ 2
γpwq ,
where we have used (7) in the second line.
2.2 Overview of the Asymptotic Results
I will now introduce the estimator of the identified set ΘI , leaving the formal definition to (37).
Suppose there exists a function gpD, θ, ξq that preserves the expectation of the moment function
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mpw, θ, ηq
EgpD, θ, ξq “ Empw, θ, ηq
and is insensitive to the biased estimation of its own nuisance parameter ξ around its true value
ξ0 “ ξ0pθq, where ξ0pθq is an identified vector-valued parameter of the distribution PD for each
θ P Θ. In many relevant cases such as Example 1, ξ0 contains the original nuisance parameter η,
but may contain more unknown parameters of the distribution PD.
To estimate the identified set ΘI I represent it as the minimizer of the criterion function Qpθ, ξ0q
ΘI :“ argmin
θPΘ
Qpθ, ξ0q, (16)
where Qpθ, ξ0q is
Qpθ, ξ0q “ }EgpD, θ, ξ0q}2`,
and its sample analog is
QN pθ, pξq :“ } 1
N
Nÿ
i“1
gpDi, θ, pξiq}2`. (17)
My goal is to use different samples in the first and the second stages in order to avoid overfitting.
Yet, simple sample splitting has a drawback that only one half of the sample is used for second-stage
estimation, which can lead to loss of efficiency in small samples. In order to use the whole sample
for the second stage yet keep the sample splitting idea, I use cross-fitting procedure described below.
Definition 1 (Cross-fitting). 1. For a random sample of size N , denote a K-fold random partition
of the sample indices rN s “ t1, 2, ..., Nu by pJkqKk“1, where K is the number of partitions and
the sample size of each fold is n “ N{K. Also for each k P rKs “ t1, 2, ...,Ku define Jck “
t1, 2, ..., NuzJk .
2. For each k P rKs, construct an estimator pξpViPJc
k
q of the nuisance parameter value ξ0 using only
the data from Jck. For any observation i P Jk, define an estimated signal pξi :“ pξpViPJckq.
Definition 2 (Definition of the Set Estimator). Let pξ “ pξpθq be the first-stage estimator of the
nuisance parameter constructed in Definition 1. Let the criterion function QN pθ, ξq be as in (17)
and pc be a positive number. The estimator pΘI of the identified set ΘI is chosen as a contour set of
the sample criterion function QN pθ, ξq of level c:
pΘI :“ CN ppc, pξq :“ tθ P Θ, NQN pθ, pξq ď pcu.
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The contour level pc, possibly data dependent, is chosen such that pΘI contains the true set ΘI
with probability approaching one
pc ě sup
θPΘI
NQN pθ, pξq w.p. Ñ 1. (18)
I establish convergence and inference properties of the contour set estimator pΘI . The first
property is formulated in terms of the convergence rate of pΘI to ΘI is based on the notion of
Hausdorff distance dHppΘI ,ΘIq:
dHppΘI ,ΘIq “ t sup
θPpΘI
dHpθ,ΘIq, sup
θPΘI
dHppΘI , θqu.
The set pΘI is said to converge to ΘI at rate ǫN if the Hausdorff distance between the sets converges
at rate ǫN :
dHppΘI ,ΘIq “ OP pǫN q. (19)
Under mild regularity conditions it is possible to achieve the nearly efficient rate ǫN “ Op
b
logN
N
q.
To conduct inference, I fix a confidence level τ P p0, 1q. A confidence region CN pcτ , pξq of level
τ is defined as a contour set CN pcτ ; pξq of level cτ such that CN pcτ ; pξq contains ΘI with probability
at least 1´ τ :
PpΘI Ď CN pcτ ; pξqq Ñ 1´ τ,N Ñ8. (20)
I construct a confidence region CN ppcτ ; pξq, where pcτ is a consistent estimator of the τ -quantile,
denoted cτ , of the inferential statistic:
CN :“ sup
θPΘI
NQN pθ; ξ0q. (21)
The consistent estimator of the τ -quantile is chosen by the subsampling algorithm defined below.
Definition 3 (Subsampling Algorithm). Partition the sample pDiqNi“1 into BN “ op
?
Nq subsam-
ples Vj, j P t1, 2, . . . , BNu of equal size b :“ rN{BN s. Compute the sample criterion function
Qj,bpθ; pξq “ }1b řiPVj gpDi, θ, pξiq}2`. Choose the level pc of the order pc „ logN . Report pcτ as the
τ -quantile of the sample of statistics
t sup
θPCN ppc,pξq
bQj,bpθ, pξq, j “ 1, 2, . . . , BNu.
Section 4 establishes the asymptotic validity of the set estimator given in Definition 2 and
subsampling algorithm of Definition 3
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3 Dynamic Game of Imperfect Information
Consider the dynamic model of strategic interaction from Bajari et al. (2007). There are K players,
denoted by t1, 2, . . . ,Ku. Each player k makes a decision ak P Ak from a finite set of discrete
alternatives Ak at time periods t P t0, 1, . . . ,8u. In each period t the players commonly observe
a vector of state variables wt P W Ă Rdw . Given the state variable wt “ w, players choose
actions simultaneously. Before choosing his action, each player k observes a vector of private
shocks pǫkpjqqjPAk corresponding to each discrete alternative j in his choice set Ak. The transition
between states follows a conditional probability distribution: P p¨|a,wq conditional on the current
state w and the action profile a “ pa1, a2, . . . , aKq.
I focus on the structural parameter describing the utility of the first player. I assume that his
per-period utility function is given by
πpa,w, ǫq “ π˜pa,w; θ0; ζ0q ` ǫ1pa1q, (22)
where a “ pa1, a2, . . . , aKq is the profile of the players’ actions, a1 P A1 is the action of the first
player, w is the state variable, and θ0 is the true value of the structural parameter θ. The per-
period utility is presented as the sum of a deterministic component π˜pa,w; θ; ζq and the private
shock ǫ1pa1q. I allow π˜pa,w; θ; ζq to depend on identified nuisance parameter ζ whose true value is
ζ0.
I assume that each player follows a pure Markov policy. The pure Markov policy for player
one σ1pw, ǫ1q : W
Ś
E Ñ A1 maps the current state w and the private shock of player one, ǫ1,
into the action space A1. If the behavior of the players is described by a Markov policy profile
σ “ pσ1, σ2, . . . , σKq, the value function is given by
V pw; θ;σq :“ Er
ÿ
tě0
βtπpσpw, ǫq, wt, ǫtq|ws. (23)
A strategy profile σ˚ is a Markov perfect equilibrium if each player k prefers its strategy σ˚k to
all alternative Markov strategies as long as the others follow the equilibrium strategy σ˚´k. That
is, the value function V pw; θ0;σ˚; η0q of the first player at the strategy σ˚ is weakly larger than the
value function of any other strategy profile σ “ pσ1, σ˚´ 1q:
V pw; θ0;σ˚; η0q ě V pw; θ0;σ; η0q @w @σ, (24)
where σ “ pσ1, σ˚´ 1q consists of a feasible suboptimal alternative for player one, σ1, and the equi-
librium profile for the other players σ˚´ 1. I assume that the each observation comes from the same
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Markov perfect equilibrium σ˚, although I do not provide conditions for the existence of such
equilibrium and recognize that there could be many such equilibria.
ASSUMPTION 2 (Equilibrium Selection). The data are generated by a single Markov perfect
equilibrium σ˚.
3.1 Casting problem as a moment inequality with a first-stage nuisance param-
eter
Define the choice-specific value function of player one vpa1, wq as the expected present value con-
ditional on the current state w and the choice a1
vpa1, wq :“ π˜pa1, w; θ0, ζ0q ` βErV pwnext; θ0;σ˚; η0q|w, pa1, σ˚´1qs.
Then, following the optimal strategy σ˚pw, ǫq, the first player chooses a1 if and only if the total
utility of a1 is not smaller than the total utility of any other choice a
1
1 P A1
vpa1, wq ` ǫpa1q ě vpa11, wq ` ǫpa11q.
Therefore, the optimal strategy of player one is characterized as
σ˚pw, ǫ1q “ arg max
a1
1
PA1
tvpa11, wq ` ǫ1pa11qu,
or, equivalently,
σ˚pa1, wq “ arg max
a1
1
PA1
tvpa11, wq ´ vp1, wq ` ǫ1pa11qu.
As discussed in Hotz and Miller (1993), under Assumption 1 the vector of differences of the choice-
specific value functions can be expressed as
vpa1, wq ´ vp1, wq “ log Ppa1|wq
Pp1|wq , (25)
where Ppa1|wq is the probability of the choice a1 P A1 conditional on the state variable w. Finally,
as a suboptimal Markov policy σ, I consider a cutoff-type strategy
σ1pw, ǫ1q “ argmax
a1PA
tvpa1, wq ´ vp1, wq ` devpa1, wq ` ǫ1pa1qu, (26)
where I add a deviation function devpa1, wq for each element vpa1, wq ´ vp1, wq. As a normaliza-
tion condition, I set devp1, wq “ 0 @w. Therefore, the inequality (24) depends on the nuisance
parameter
η :“ pζ, tγjkpwq, j P AkuKk“1,Ppwnext|w, aqu (27)
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that consists of any original nuisance parameter ζ that may appear in the utility function (22), the
conditional choice probabilities of all players
γjkpwq :“ Ppak “ j|wq, j P Ak, k P t1, 2, . . . ,Ku,
and the conditional distribution Ppwnext|w, aq.
I construct the identified set ΘI using a subset of inequalities implied by the equilibrium def-
inition (i.e, (24)). Let qpwq be an L-vector of non-negative weighting functions. Let devpa1, wq :
A1
Ś
W Ñ Rd be an L-vector of deviation functions whose coordinate l P t1, 2, . . . , Lu corresponds
to a deviation strategy devlpa1, wq. Define the moment vector-valued function as
mpw, θ, ηq “ qpwq ¨ pV pw; θ;σ; ηq ´ V pw; θ;σ˚; ηqq, (28)
whose component mlpD, θ, ηq is equal to the weighted difference V pw; θ;σl; ηq ´ V pw; θ;σ˚; ηq:
mlpw, θ, ηq :“ qlpwqpV pw; θ;σl; ηq ´ V pw; θ;σ˚; ηqq, l P t1, 2, . . . , Lu
evaluated at a strategy profile σl “ pσ1,l, σ˚´1q. The suboptimal strategy of the first player σ1,l
is given in (26) with the deviation function devlpa1, wq. The identified set ΘI is defined as the
collection of parameter values θ that obey inequality restrictions in expectation
ΘI :“ tθ P Θ : Empw, θ, η0q ď 0u, (29)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the unconditional distribution of the state w.
3.2 Simulation estimator of the value function
The value function V pw; θ;σ; ηq appearing in the moment function (28) is not available in closed
form. However, it can be approximated by Monte Carlo simulation as in Bajari et al. (2007). In
the first stage, one constructs an estimate pη of the nuisance parameter η that is defined in (27).
In the second stage, one simulates the sequence of states and shocks from the estimated first stage
parameter pη and averages the realization of the value function over multiple simulation draws. A
single simulation draw is given by Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1 Simulation Estimator of the Expected Value Function
Input: initial state w; parameter value θ; estimated first-stage parameter pη; strategy pro-
file σpw, ǫq that is a known function of the first-stage parameter pη. Initialize V pw0; θ;σ; ηq “
0.
1: Draw a shock vector ǫ from the type 1 extreme value distribution and compute the action
profile a “ σpw, ǫq.
2: Draw the state variable wt from the conditional distribution P pwt|wt´1, at´1q.
3: Draw a vector of shocks ǫt from the type 1 extreme value distribution. Compute the action
at “ σpwt, ǫtq.
4: Add the time t discounted utility:
V pw0; θ;σ; pηq “ V pw0; θ;σ; pηq ` βtpπ˜pat, wt; θ; pζq ` ǫ1pa1,tqq.
Return pV pw0; θ;σ; pηq.
In order to evaluate the value function V pw; θ;σ; ηq at different parameter values θ1 P Θ and
θ2 P Θ, I use the same simulation draws. As long as the number of simulation draws is large enough,
the simulation error does not affect the asymptotic properties of the estimator of the identified set
pΘI as discussed in Pakes and Pollard (1989).
3.3 Bias Correction Term for the Expected Value Function
When the nuisance parameter η is high-dimensional and estimated by machine learning, the plug-in
estimator of value function is biased. To make the moment function (28) insensitive to first-stage
bias, I derive bias correction term. As discussed in Newey (1994), the bias correction term for a
vector-valued nuisance parameter is equal to the sum of individual terms of individual components.
Moreover, the bias correction term for the conditional probability of choice j has the product
structure
αCCPj pD; θ; γjq “ Γpw; θqp1ta1“ju ´ γjpwqq.
Furthermore, according to Newey (1994), the function Γpw; θq is implicitly defined by the orthog-
onality condition explained below.
Let gpD, θ, ξq be a moment function. Define the Gateaux derivative map Dr : Ξ
Ś
ΘÑ RL as
Br
"
E
„
gpD, θ, rpξ ´ ξ0q ` ξ0q

, ξ P Ξ
*
,
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for all r P r0, 1q, which I assume exists. I also denote the pathwise derivative of the expected
moment function at the true value ξ0
BξEgpD, θ, ξ0qrξ ´ ξ0s “ B0EgpD, θ, rpξ ´ ξ0q ` ξ0q.
Definition 4 (Neyman orthogonality of moment function). The moment function gpD; θ; ξq obeys
the orthogonality condition at ξ0 with respect to the nuisance realization set ΞN Ă Ξ if the pathwise
derivative Drrξ ´ ξ0s exists for all r P r0, 1q and vanishes at r “ 0 for each θ P Θ
BξEgpD, θ, ξ0qrξ ´ ξ0s “ 0, ξ P Ξ, θ P Θ. (30)
The definition of Neyman orthogonality requires that the moment function be insensitive to
the biased estimation of ξ. This condition is the generalization of the orthogonality condition for
point-identified models in Chernozhukov et al. (2017a) that is required to hold only at the true
value θ0 of identified parameter θ. In contrast to the point-identified case, I require the equality in
(30) to hold at each point θ of the parameter space Θ. In many relevant cases (e.g., if the moment
function gpD, θ, ξq is linear in θ), the orthogonality condition (30) on the set Θ follows from the
orthogonality (30) on a finite subset of Θ. Rewriting the orthogonality condition (30) for the bias
correction term for the value function gives
B0ErV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγ ´ γ0q ` γ0q ´ Γpw; θqrγpwq ´ γ0pwqs “ 0.
I find the function Γpw; θq from the recursive definition of the value function (5). In the case of
Example 1 the recursive definition can be rewritten in the unconditional form
E
„
V pw; θ;σ˚; γ0q ´
`´Rp1´ γ0pwqq ` p´µsqγ0pwq ` PSσ˚pγ0q
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 0sp1 ´ γ0pwqq
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 1sγ0pwq
˘ “ 0, (31)
where γ0pwq is the true value of the conditional choice probability and θ “ pR,µq consists of the
replacement and maintenance costs. The unknown function γpwq appears in Equation (31) both
outside the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; γq and inside of this function. I consider a local deviation of
the choice probability γp¨q from its value γ0p¨q for each value of the parameters R and µ. Applying
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chain rule to the Equation (31) yields a pathwise derivative
B0EV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγ ´ γ0q ` γ0q “ 1
1´ βE
`´ µs`R` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 1s
´ ErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 0s ` dPSσ
˚pγ0q
dγ
˘
“ 1
1´ βE
`´ µs`R` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 1s
´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γ0q|w, a “ 0s ´ 2
γpwq ´ log
γpwq
1´ γpwq
˘
,
where the last equality follows from the logistic distribution of the private shocks (Assumption 1).
In what follows I derive the bias correction terms for the other nuisance parameters that are
present in the dynamic discrete choice in Bajari et al. (2007). Let qpwq be a weighting function.
Define
λpw1q :“ Erqpwq|wnext “ w1s
as the expectation of the weighting function qpwq evaluated at the current state w conditional on
the future state wnext. Denote the expectation of the choice j made by player one conditional on
the state w by γjpwq :“ Er1ta1“ju|ws. Let
γpwq :“ pγ2pwq, γ3pwq, . . . , γA1pwqq
be the A1´1 vector of these probabilities. Define the conditional expectation of the current private
shock evaluated at the equilibrium strategy σ1˚ “ σ1˚ pw, ǫ, γq as
PSσ˚
1
pγq :“ Erǫ1pσ˚1 pw, ǫ1, γqq|ws. (32)
Lemma 1 gives the bias correction term, αCCPj pD; θ; γjq, that makes the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; ηq
insensitive to the biased estimation of γj.
Lemma 1 (Bias correction term for own conditional choice probability). Suppose the state variable
w has a stationary distribution and Assumption 1 holds. Suppose the conditional probability of each
choice γjpwq, j P t2, 3, . . . , Ju is bounded away from zero and one. Then the bias correction term
αCCPj pD; θ; γjq is
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αCCPj pD; θ; γjq “
qpwq
qpwq ´ βλpwq
`
Eǫ´1rπ˜ppj, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qq;w; θq ´ π˜p1, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qq;w; θqs
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; η0q|w, pj, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qqs
´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; η0q|w, p1, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qqs
` BγjPSσ˚
1
pγ0q
˘p1a1“j ´ γjpwqq (33)
where BγjPSσ˚
1
pγq is the partial derivative of (32) with respect to γj .
Lemma 2 (Bias Correction Term for the Law of Motion of the State Variable). Suppose the high-
dimensional state variable w has a stationary distribution. Let a “ pa1, a2, . . . , aKq be a given
profile of actions. Then the bias correction term for the conditional quantile function Qpu,w, aq of
level u is
αTRANSσ pD; θ; ηq “
βlpwq
lpwq ´ βλpwqEr∇wnextV pwnext; θ;σ; η0q|w, as
Kź
k“1
Ppσkpw, ǫkq “ ak|wq (34)
1wnextďQpu,w,jq´u
fpwnext|w, a “ σpw, ǫqq .
Lemma 3 (Bias Correction Term for the opponent’s conditional choice probability). Suppose the
state variable w has a stationary distribution. Let the number of players be 2 (i.e, K “ 2). Then
the bias correction term for the conditional probability of the choice j2 made by my opponent is
α
CCP,op
j pD; θ; γj2q “
qpwq
qpwq ´ βλpwq
` A1ÿ
j1“1
pπ˜ppj1, j2q, w; θq ´ π˜ppj1, 1q, w; θqqPpσ1pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wq
` β“ A1ÿ
j1“1
ErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; η0q|w, pj1, j2qs ´
A1ÿ
j1“1
ErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; η0q|w, pj1, 1qs
‰¨
¨ Ppσ1pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wqqp1a2“j2 ´ Ppa2 “ j2qq. (35)
3.4 Using Linearity to Reduce Computation
Both the value function and the bias correction terms presented above are not available in closed
form and must be simulated. When the value function is a linear function of θ, the simulation can
be simplified. Suppose there exist basis functions Ψ1pw;σ; ηq,Ψ2pw;σ; ηq such that
V pw; θ;σ; ηq “ θΨ1pw;σ; ηq `Ψ2pw;σ; ηq (36)
is an affine function of θ. Then one can simulate the basis functions Ψ1pw;σ; ηq,Ψ2pw;σ; ηq instead
of simulating the value function for each θ P Θ. Lemma 4 provides the sufficient conditions for the
linearity of the value function and the individual bias correction terms provided in Lemmas 1, 2, 3.
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Lemma 4 (Sufficient Conditions for Linearity). The following conditions hold. (1) The per-period
utility function given in (22) is a linear function of θ. (2) The distribution of the private shock
for each player is known. Then there exists a vector of basis functions Ψpw;σ; ηq such that (36)
holds. Furthermore, each individual bias correction term given in (33), (34), and (35) is also a
linear function θ.
4 Asymptotic Theory
Suppose I have a collection of inequality restrictions on an economic model coming from the data
structure and/or the assumptions about the data generating process. These restrictions are em-
bodied into a moment function gpD, θ, ξq : DŚΘŚΞ Ñ RL, where θ P Θ Ă Rd is the target
parameter. In addition to the target parameter θ, the moment function gpD, θ, ξq depends on a
nuisance parameter ξ “ ξpθq whose true value ξ0 “ ξ0pθq is an identified parameter of the data
distribution PD and belongs to a convex subset of a normed vector space Ξ. The object of inter-
est is an identified set ΘI defined as a collection of parameter values θ that satisfy the inequality
restrictions
ΘI :“ tθ P Θ : EgpD, θ, ξ0q ď 0u (37)
at the true value ξ0 of the nuisance parameter.
The identified set ΘI is characterized as the minimizer of the criterion function
ΘI :“ argmin
θPΘ
Qpθ, ξ0q “ argmin
θPΘ
}EgpD, θ, ξ0q}2.
I assume that the following partial identification condition holds. There exist positive constant
C ą 0 and δ ą 0 such that
}EgpD, θ, ξ0q}` ě CdHpθ,ΘIq ^ δ. (38)
This condition states that once θ is bounded away from Θ, the moment EgpD, θ, ξ0q is bounded
away from ΘI by a number that is proportional to the Hausdorff distance dHpθ,ΘIq from θ to the
identified set ΘI . This condition ensures that the true moment function gpD, θ, ξ0q distinguishes
the boundary of the identified set.
Impact of the First-Stage Estimation. In the next condition I introduce a sequence of neigh-
borhoods ΞθN Ă Ξθ of ξ0pθq that contain the estimate pξpθq of ξ0pθq w.p. approaching one. As the
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sample size N increases, the neighborhoods shrink. The quality of the estimation of the first-stage
parameter is defined as the speed of shrinkage of the neighborhood ΞN pθq around ξ0pθq. I refer to
it as the first-stage rate gN . Finally, I assume that the second-order derivative of the functional
EgpD, θ, ξq is well-behaved. Combined with the orthogonality condition and the upper bound on
the first-stage rate gN , this assumption ensures that I can ignore the impact of the estimation errorpξpθq´ξ0pθq on the second and the higher-order derivatives of the moment function EgpD, θ, ξq with
respect to ξ at ξ0.
Condition 1 (Orthogonality). There exists a sequence ΞθN of subsets of Ξ
θ: ΞθN Ă Ξθ such that
the following conditions hold. (1) The true value ξ0pθq belongs to ΞθN for all N ě 1. (2) There
exists a sequence of numbers φN “ op1q such that with probability at least 1 ´ φN , pξp¨q belongs to
Ξ :“ŚΞθ uniformly over θ P Θ. (3) The set ΞθN shrinks around ξpθq at the following statistical
rate gN “ opN´1{4q uniformly over θ:
sup
θPΘ
sup
ξpθqPΞθ
}ξpθq ´ ξ0pθq}P,2 ď gN .
The moment function gpD, θ, ξq obeys the orthogonality condition at ξ0. (5) There exists a sequence
sN “ opN´1{2q such that the second Gateaux derivative of the functional Gpθ, ξpθqq with respect to
ξ at ξ0 is bounded:
sup
θPΘ
sup
ξPΞθN
sup
rPr0,1q
}B2rEgpD, θ, rpξ ´ ξ0q ` ξ0q} ď sN .
The next condition requires that the moment function gpD; θ; ξpθqq is sufficiently regular with
respect to θ for each fixed element ξ P Ξ of the nuisance realization set Ξ. I consider a class
Fξ :“ tgp¨, θ, ξpθqq, θ P Θu
and require the uniform covering entropy of this class to be bounded.
Condition 2 (Regularity of Moment Function). The following conditions hold. (1) There exists
a measurable envelope function Fξ “ FξpDq that bounds all elements in the function class almost
surely
sup
θPΘ
|glpD, θ, ξq| ď FξpDq a.s. , l P t1, 2, . . . , Lu.
Moreover, the envelope Fξ has a finite c-norm for some c ą 2 }Fξ}P,c :“
`ş
DPD |FξpDq|c
˘1{c ď c1.
(2) There exist finite constants a and v such that the uniform covering entropy of the class Fξ is
bounded
sup
Q˜
logNpǫ}Fξ}Q˜,2, Fξ , } ¨ }Q˜,2 ď v logpa{ǫq, for all 0 ă ǫ ď 1. (39)
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(3) There exists a sequence r1N obeying r
1
N logp1{r1N q “ op1q that is an upper bound for the following
quantity
sup
θPΘ
sup
ξPΞθ
`
E}gpD, θ, ξpθqq ´ gpD, θ, ξ0pθqq}2
˘1{2 ď r1N .
Conditions 2(1)-(2) are the generalization of the regularity assumption in the point-identified
moment problem of Chernozhukov et al. (2017a). Because ξpθq depends on θ, conditions 2(1)-(2)
are non-standard and require verification in applications. However, this requirement is mild when
the nuisance parameter ξpθq is a linear function of θ. Suppose that the true value of the nuisance
parameter ξ0pθq is a linear function of θ
ξ0pθq :“ ξa0 pDq1θ ` ξb0pDq, (40)
where ξa0pDq and ξb0pDq are the identified parameters of the distribution PD. Then conditions
2(1)-(2) can be reformulated in terms of the nuisance parameters tξa0 , ξb0u that no longer depend
on θ. When (40) holds, Conditions 2 (1)-(2) are satisfied for many practical cases. In particular,
the functions ξa0pDq, ξb0pDq can be estimated by ℓ1-regularized methods, random forests, and deep
neural nets under plausible assumptions about their structure.
Donsker Property. Let Θ1 be an open neighborhood of Θ. I require the moment function
gpDi, θ, ξ0q to have a Donsker property defined as follows. In the metric space L8pΘ1q,
GNgpDi, θ, ξ0q :“
?
NpENgpDi, θ, ξ0q ´ EgpDi, θ, ξ0qq ñ ∆pθq, (41)
where ∆pθq is a mean zero Gaussian process on Θ with a.s. continuous paths and Varp∆pθqq ą 0 for
each θ P Θ1. In addition, the probability space pΩ,F ,Pq is rich enough to support the representation
(41).
Theorem 5 (Estimation and Inference for Semiparametric Functional Inequalities). Suppose Con-
ditions (38), 1, 2, and (41) hold. Let pΘI be a contour set estimator of Definition 2. Let pc be such
that
pc ě sup
θPΘI
NQN pθ, ξ0q w.p. Ñ 1 (42)
holds. Then the Hausdorff distance dHpΘI , pΘIq between the estimated set pΘI and ΘI converges at
rate OP p
ap1_ pcq{Nq: dHppΘI ,ΘIq “ OP pap1_ pcq{Nq.
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Theorem 5 is my first main result. It establishes the sufficient conditions on the moment
function to deliver the rate of convergence of pΘI to ΘI . It suggests that the contour level pc as small
as possible subject to the constraint (42). Setting pc “ OP p1q subject to (42) delivers the optimal
rate, but this choice is infeasible. Setting pc „ logN delivers a nearly efficient rate.
In many cases it is possible to establish convergence without the requirement (42). This is
possible because the criterion function is degenerate (17).
Definition 5 (Degeneracy). The following conditions hold. (1) There exists a sequence of sub-
sets ΘN of Θ, which cannot depend on ξ, such that the criterion function QN pθ, ξq vanishes on
these subsets w.p. approaching one. That is, @p ą 0 there exists Np such that for all N ě NP
infξPΞN PpQN pθ, ξq ´ infθPΘQN pθ, ξq “ 0 @θ P Θq ě 1 ´ p. (2) These sets can approximate the
identified set ΘI in the Hausdorff distance sufficiently well: dHpΘN ,ΘIq ď ǫN . (3) The sequence
ǫN “ OP pN´1{2q.
Lemma 6 (Sufficient Conditions for Degeneracy). Suppose Conditions (38), 1, 2, and (41) hold.
In addition, there exist positive constants C,M, δ such that
max
l
EglpD, θ, ξ0q ď ´Cpǫ^ δq for all θ P Θ´ǫI , (43)
dHpΘ´ǫI ,ΘIq ďMǫ for all ǫ P r0, δs, l P t1, 2, . . . , Lu
Then the criterion function QN pθ, ξq obeys the degeneracy condition in the sense of Definition 5.
Suppose the contour level pc obeys
pc ě min
θPΘ
QN pθ, pξq _ logN?
N
w.p. Ñ 1. (44)
Then the Hausdorff distance dHpΘI , pΘIq converges at rate OP pN´1{2q, where pΘI is a contour level
set as in Definition 2.
Lemma 6 is my second main result. It provides the sufficient conditions under which the
identified set ΘI can be estimated at the fastest possible rate ǫN “ OP pN´1{2q. It requires that
the sample criterion function QN pθ, ξ0q be flat on the (possibly) data-dependent sets ΘN that
approximate the identified set ΘI sufficiently well. If this requirements holds, the contour level
pc0 :“ argminθPΘ0 QN pθ, ξ0q delivers the optimal rate for the contour level set CN ppc0, ξ0q based on
the true value of the nuisance parameter (see, e.g. Chernozhukov et al. (2007)). We show that a
modified choice pc given in (44) delivers the optimal rate in the presence of the nuisance parameter
pξ estimated in the first stage on an auxiliary sample.
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Subsampling. I wish to construct the contour set Cppc, pξq that has confidence region property
(20). To do this, I must find the asymptotic distribution of the inferential statistic
CN :“ sup
θPΘI
Qpθ; ξ0q
that can be used to estimate the τ -quantile of CN . Define the random variable
C :“ sup
θPΘI
}Ipθq `∆pθq}2`, (45)
where Ipθq is an L-vector of functions Ilpθq, l P t1, . . . , Luq. The function Ilpθq is defined as follows:
Ilpθq :“
$’&
’%
´8, EglpD, θ, ξ0q ă 0,
0, EglpD, θ, ξ0q “ 0.
Chernozhukov et al. (2007) show that CN converges to C in distribution, and that C has a non-
degenerate and continuous distribution function. The final requirement for the validity of the
subsampling algorithm of Definition 3 is that the inferential statistic
sup
θPΘǫNI
CN pθ, pξq
is well-behaved on the ǫN -expansion of the identified set ΘI . A sufficient condition for this require-
ment is given below.
Condition 3 (Sufficient Conditions for Subsampling). (1) There exists a constant Cmax ă 8 such
that the moment function is bounded: supθPΘ |EgpD, θ, ξ0q| ď CmaxdHpθ,ΘIq. (2) The rates sN , r1N
and ǫN obey the following bound:
?
NpsN ` r1N logp1{r1N q `N´1{2`1{cqǫN “ op1q.
Theorem 7 (Validity of Subsampling for Moment Inequalities). Suppose Conditions (38), 1, 2,
(41), 3 hold. Suppose the number of subsamples satisfies b “ op?Nq, b Ñ 8. Let τ be the desired
coverage level. Then (1) the critical value pc of Definition 3 converges in probability to the τ -quantile
of C, where C given in (45) and (2) PpΘI Ď CN ppc, pξqq “ 1´ τ .
5 Appendix
Notation. We use standard notation for numeric and stochastic dominance. For two numeric
sequences denote tan, bnu, n ě 1 : an À
?
n stands for an “ Opbnq. For two sequences of
random variables denote tan, bn, n ě 1u : an ÀP
?
n stands for an “ OP pbnq. Finally, let
27
a ^ b “ minta, bu and a _ b “ maxta, bu. We use the standard notation for empirical processes.
Denote the sample average EN rfis :“ 1N
řN
i“1 fpDiq and the centered, scaled sample average as
GN rfis :“ 1?N
řN
i“1pfpDiq ´ EfpWiqq. Denote the sample average within a partition Ik of size n
as EnrfpDiqs :“ 1n
ř
iPIk fpDiq and GnrfpDiqs :“ 1?n
ř
iPIkpfpDiq ´ ErfpDiqsq. The Hausdorff dis-
tance between sets A and B is defined as dHpA,Bq :“ maxtsupaPA dpa,Bq, supbPB dpb,Aqu where
dpb,Aq :“ infaPA }b ´ a} and dHpA,Bq “ 8 if either of the sets is empty. The ǫ-expansion of
the set ΘI is defined as Θ
ǫ
I :“ tθ P Θ : dpθ,ΘIq ď ǫu and the ǫ-contraction of ΘI is defined as
Θ´ǫI :“ tθ P ΘI : dpθ,ΘzΘIq ě ǫu. Let }x}` “ }maxpx, 0q} and }x}´ “ }maxp´x, 0q}, where the
operation max is performed elementwise.
Proof of Remark 1. Step 1. Bias correction term for the conditional choice probability. I
consider the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; ηq “ V pw; θ;σ˚; γq as a function of the current state variable
w, parameter θ, and the conditional choice probability γ “ γpwq holding the other value of the
nuisance component ρ at its true value ρ0. I wish to construct a bias correction term α
CCP pD; θ; γq
such that orthogonality condition (30) holds:
BγErV pw; θ;σ˚; γ0q ` αCCP pD; θ; γ0qs “ 0 @θ P Θ.
Denote the expected value of the current private shock for the optimal strategy σ˚ as
PSσ˚pγq :“ Erǫpσ˚pw, ǫ, γqq|ws,
where by logistic distribution of the private shocks I get:
PSσ˚pγq :“ Epǫp1q ´ ǫp0qq1tǫp1q´ǫp0qě´ log γpwq
1´γpwq
u “ ´ log γpwq ´ p1´ γpwqq log
1´ γpwq
γpwq . (46)
I rewrite the recursive equation (5) for the Example 1:
V pw; θ;σ˚; γq “ ´Rp1´ γpwqq ` p´µsqγpwq ` PSσ˚pγq (47)
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 0sp1 ´ γpwqq ` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 1sγpwq.
I seek for the bias correction term αCCP pD; θ; γq that has the following form:
αCCP pD; θ; γq “ Γpw; θqp1ta“1u ´ γpwqq, (48)
where Γpw; θq is determined by the following property:
B0EV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγ ´ γ0q ` γ0q “ EΓpw; θqrγpwq ´ γ0pwqs. (49)
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I find the function Γpw; θq by the application of the implicit function theorem to the recursive
equation (47). I rewrite (47) in the unconditional form:
E
„
V pw; θ;σ˚; γqlooooooomooooooon
S1pV pw;σ˚;γqq
´ `´Rp1´ γpwqq ` p´µsqγpwq ` PSσ˚pγqlooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooon
S2pγq
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 0sp1 ´ γpwqqlooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
S3pV pw;σ˚;γq,γq
`βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 1sγpwqlooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooon
S4pV pw;σ˚;γq,γq
˘
“ 0.
Recognize that γpwq appears in each summand of the expression above: both inside the value
function
S1pV pw;σ˚;γqq, S3pV pw;σ˚;γq, γq, S4pV pw;σ˚;γq, γq
and outside of it:
S2pγq, S3pV pw;σ˚; γq,γq, S4pV pw;σ˚; γq,γq.
Taking the derivative with respect to the outside presence of γ gives:
Sout “ E
`´ µs`R` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 1s ´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 0s
` dPSσ˚pγ0q
dγ0
˘rγpwq ´ γ0pwqs.
Taking the derivative of the expected current shock PSσ˚pγq defined in (46) with respect to γ gives:
dPSσ˚pγq
dγ
“ ´ 2
γpwq ´ log
γpwq
1´ γpwq .
Therefore, the pathwise (Gateaux) derivative with respect to the outside component is:
Sout “ EΓpw; θqrγpwq ´ γ0pwqs.
Taking the derivative inside the value function requires some preparation. Recognize that:
βErS3pV pwnext;σ˚; γq; γ0qs “ βEErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 0sp1 ´ γ0pwqq (50)
“ βEV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq
1ta“1u
1´ γ0pwq p1´ γ0pwqq
“ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq1ta“1u
“ βEV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γqλ0pwnextq,
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where
λjpwnextq :“ Er1ta“ju|wnexts, j P A
is the expectation of the current choice 1ta “ ju conditional on the future state wnext. Assuming
that the state variable has a stationary distribution, I get:
EV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γqλ0pwnextq “ EV pw; θ;σ˚; γqλ0pwq,
which implies:
βErS3pV pwnext;σ˚; γq; γ0qs “ EV pw; θ;σ˚; γqλ0pwq. (51)
The same argument applied to S4 delivers:
βErS4pV pwnext;σ˚; γq; γ0qs “ EV pw; θ;σ˚; γqλ1pwq. (52)
Combining the (51) and (52) and recognizing that
ř
jPA λjpwq “ 1 gives:
βErS3pV pwnext;σ˚; γq; γ0q ` S4pV pwnext;σ˚; γq; γ0qs “ βEV pw; θ;σ˚; γq.
Therefore,
BγErS3pV pwnext;σ˚; γq; γ0q ` S4pV pwnext;σ˚; γq; γ0qs “ βBγEV pw; θ;σ˚; γq.
Plugging this result into (47) gives:
Sins :“ p1´ βqB0EV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγ ´ γ0q ` γ0q.
According to the chain rule, the sum of the derivatives with respect to the inside and the outside
presence of γ around γ0 is equal to zero:
Sout ` Sins “ 0,
which implies that
B0EV pw;σ˚; rpγ ´ γ0q ` γ0q “ ´ 1
1´ βEΓpw; θqrγpwq ´ γ0pwqs.
Therefore, the function Γpw; θq is equal to:
Γpw; θq “ ´µs`R` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 1s ´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γq|w, a “ 0s
´ 2
γpwq ´ log
γpwq
1´ γpwq
and the bias correction term for the conditional choice probability is equal to:
αCCP pD; θ; γq :“ ´ 1
1´ βΓpw; θq
`
1ta“1u ´ γpwq
˘
. (53)
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Bias correction term for the transition function. I consider the value function V pw; θ;σ; ηq
as a function of the current state w, the parameter θ and the transition function ρp¨q given in
(34) holding the conditional probability of replacement γ “ γ0 fixed at its true value. Since the
estimation of the nuisance parameter ρ affects the value function V pw; θ; σ˜; ηq evaluated for both
the optimal and a suboptimal strategy (i.e, σ˜ P tσ, σ˚u), I focus on a Markov policy σ˜ that includes
both σ˚ and σ as special cases. Let
PSσ˜pwq :“ Erǫpσ˜pw, ǫqq|ws (54)
denote the expected current shock of the Markov policy σ˜pw, ǫq conditionally on the current state
w. Denote also by
γσ˜0 pwq :“ Erσ˜pw, ǫq|ws (55)
the conditional probability of choice a “ 1 under the strategy σ. The recursive equation for the
value function takes the form:
E
“
V pw; θ; σ˜; ρqloooooomoooooon
R1pV pw;σ˜;ρqq
´ `´Rp1´ γσ˜0 pwqq ` p´µsqγσ˜0 pwq ` PSσ˜pwq (56)
` β ErV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρq|w, σ˜pw, ǫq “ 0sp1 ´ γσ˜0 pwqqloooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
R3pV pw;σ˜;ρqq
` βEerV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρq|w, σ˜pw, ǫq “ 1sγσ˜0 pwqlooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
R4pV pw;σ˜;ρq;ρq
˘‰ “ 0
Recognize that the function ρ appears in each of the expressions
R1pV pw; σ˜; ρqq, R3pV pw; σ˜; ρqq, R4pV pw; σ˜; ρq; ρq
inside the value function. In the expression R4pV pw; σ˜; ρq; ρq, it also appears outside the value
function, that is, through the conditional distribution of P pwnext|w, a “ 1q. The derivative with
respect to the outside presence of ρ is equal to:
Rout :“ B0ER4pV pw; σ˜; ρq; rpρ´ ρ0q ` ρ0q
“ B0EeV prpρpwq ´ ρ0pwqq ` ρ0pwq ` e; θ; σ˜; ρ0qγσ˜0 pwq
“ EerdV px; θ; σ˜; ρ0q
dx
|x“ρ0pwq`esγσ˜0 pwq
“ ErdV px; θ; σ˜; ρ0q
dx
|x“wnext |w, a “ 1sγσ˜0 pwq.
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The derivative with respect to the inside presence of ρ requires some preparation. For any Markov
policy σ I see that:
βER4pV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρq, ρ0q “ βErV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρq|w, σ˜pw, ǫq “ 1sγσ0 pwq
“ βEV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρq
1σ˜pw,ǫq“1
γσ˜0 pwq
γσ˜0 pwq
“ EV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρqλσ˜1 pwnextq
“ EV pw; θ; σ˜; ρqλσ˜1 pwq, (57)
where in the third line I used λσ˜j pwnextq “ Er1tσ˜pw,ǫq“ju|wnexts, j P J , and in the fourth line I used
the stationarity of the distribution. To sum up,
βER4pV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρq, ρ0q “ EV pw; θ; σ˜; ρqλσ˜1 pwq. (58)
The same argument can be applied to the term ER3pV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρqq:
βER3pV pwnext; θ; σ˜; ρq, ρ0q “ EV pw; θ; σ˜; ρqλσ˜0 pwq. (59)
Combining (58) and (59) gives:
Rins :“ p1´ βqB0EV pw; θ; σ˜; rpρ´ ρ0q ` ρ0q (60)
for any Markov policy σ. According to the chain rule,
Rins `Rout “ 0.
Therefore,
B0EV pw; θ; σ˜; rpρ´ ρ0q ` ρ0q “ β
1´ βEe
dV pt; θ; σ˜; ρ0q
dt
|t“ρ0pwq`eγσ0 pwq,
and the bias correction term for the transition function is equal to:
αTRANSσ˜ pD; θ; ξq :“
β
1´ βEer
dV pt; θ; σ˜; ρ0q
dt
|t“ρ0pwq`esγσ˜0 pwqpsnext ´ ρpwqq, (61)
where ξ an unknown vector-valued function of the state variable w whose true value ξ0 “ ξ0pθq
consists of the original nuisance parameter η0 and
ξ0pθq :“ tη0,Π0p¨, θqu, (62)
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where Π0pw, θq :“ ErdVσ˜px;θ;η0qdx |x“wnext |ws is the expectation of the derivative of the value function
with respect to the state variable evaluated at the future state conditional on the current state w.
To sum up, the bias correction term for Example 1 is equal to:
αpD; θ; ηq :“ ´αCCP pD; θ; γq ` αTRANSσ pD; θ; γq ´ αTRANSσ˚ pD; θ; γq,
where αCCP pD; θ; γq is given in (48) and αTRANSσ pD; θ; ξq is given in (61). 
Proof of Remark 2. Step 1. Bias Correction Term for conditional choice probability of
Apple. I seek for the bias correction term αCCP pw; γAq such that takes the form:
αCCP pw; θ; γAq “ ΓApw; θqp1aA“1 ´ γApwqq
and the function ΓApw; θq satisfies the condition:
B0EV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγApwq ´ γA,0pwqq ` γA,0pwqq “ EΓApw; θqrγApwq ´ γA,0pwqs.
I find the function ΓApw; θq by the application of the implicit function theorem. I write V pw; θ;σ˚; ηq “
V pw; θ;σ˚; γAq in order to focus on the nuisance parameter γA holding the other parameter γP at
its true value. The recursive equation of the value function of Apple is:
EV pw; θ;σ˚; γAq “ Er´Rp1´ γApwqq ` p´µsqγApwq ` PSσ˚pγAq
` δ0γP,0pwq ` pδ1 ´ δ0qγP,0pwqγApwq
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γAq|w, a “ 0sp1 ´ γApwqq
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γAq|w, a “ 1spγApwqqs.
The function γA appears in each summand of the equation above both inside and outside the value
function V pw; θ;σ˚; γAq. Let Sout,Sins be defined as in Example 1. Taking the derivative with
repsect to the oustide presence of γA, I get:
B0Sout “ ´p´µs`Rq ` pδ1 ´ δ0qγP,0pwq ` dPSσ˚pγq
dγ
|γA,0
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γA,0q|w, a “ 1s ´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γA,0q|w, a “ 0s
where the second line follows from the definition of the choice-specific value functions and the third
line follows from the logistic assumption of the shocks by (25).Taking the derivative with respect
to the inside presence of γA, I get:
B0Sins “ p1´ βqB0EV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγA ´ γA,0q ` γA,0q.
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The function ΓApw; θq follows:
ΓApw; θq “ p´µs`Rq ` pδ1 ´ δ0qγP,0pwq ` dPSσ
˚ptq
dt
|t“γA,0
` βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γAq|w, a “ 1s ´ βErV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γAq|w, a “ 0s
and
αCCP pD; θ; γAq “ 1
1´ βΓApw; θqp1aA“1 ´ γApwqq.
I write V pw; θ;σ; ηq “ V pw; θ;σ; γP q holding γA fixed at its true value γA,0. I find the bias correction
term α˚P pD; θ; γP q such that:
BγPErV pw; θ;σ˚; γP q ` α˚P pD; θ; γP qs “ 0.
The bias correction term takes the form:
α˚P pD; θ; γP q :“ ΓP pw; θqp1taP“1u ´ γP pwqq.
The function ΓP pw; θq is defined by the application of the implicit function theorem. Using the
approach of Example 1, I find that
B0EV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγP ´ γP,0q ` γP,0qp1´ βq “ δ0 ` pδ1 ´ δ0qγA,0pwq.
and
ΓP pw; θq “ 1
1´ β pδ0 ` pδ1 ´ δ0qγA,0pwqq.
Similarly, the bias correction term ασP pD; θ; γP q takes the form:
ασP pD; θ; γP q :“ ΓσP pw; θqp1taP“1u ´ γP pwqq,
where
ΓσP pw; θq “
1
1´ β pδ0 ` pδ1 ´ δ0qγ
σ
0 pwqq,
where γσpwq :“ Ppσpw, ǫq “ 1|wq. To sum up, the bias correction term for the conditional proba-
bility of Player 2 entry is equal to:
α˚P pD; θ; γP q :“
1
1´ β pδ1 ´ δ0qpγ
σ
0 pwq ´ γA,0pwqqp1taP“1u ´ γP pwqq. (63)

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Remark 3 (Bias correction term for point-identified problems). Suppose the parameter of interest
β0 is the population average of the value function
β0 :“ ErV pw; θ0;σ˚; ηqs.
Then the bias correction term for the conditional choice probability of player one is equal to:
αCCP pD; θ; γq :“ ´ 1
1´ β
2
γpwq p1ta1“1u ´ γpwqq,
where the choice probability γ0pwq is defined in (25). Furthermore, if the parameter interest β0 is
equal to the weighted average of the value function
β0 “ EqpwqV pw; θ0;σ˚; ηq, (64)
the bias correction term is equal to:
αCCPq pD; θ; γq “ ´
qpwq
qpwq ´ βλpwq
2
γpwq p1ta1“1u ´ γpwqq,
where λpw1q :“ Erqpwq|wnext “ w1s is the expectation of the weighting function qpwq conditionally
on the future state wnext.
6 Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Let η be as in (27). Consider the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; ηq “ V pw; θ;σ˚; γjq
as a function of γj holding the other components of the nuisance parameter η fixed at the true
value. The recursive equation for the value function takes the form:
EqpwqV pw; θ;σ˚; γjqlooooooomooooooon
S1pV pw;σ˚;γjqq
´
Jÿ
j“2
Eǫ´1qpwqrπ˜ppj, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qq;w; θ0qloooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooon (65)
´ π˜pp1, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qq;w; θ0qq|wsγjpwq ` PSσ˚
1
pγpwqqlooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
S2pγj q
(66)
` βEqpwqrV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γjq|w, p1, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qqsloooooooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooooooon
S3pV pw;σ˚;γjqq
` β
Jÿ
j“2
Eǫ´1rV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γjq|w, pj, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qqs (67)
´ Eǫ´1rV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γjq|w, p1, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qqsγjpwq “ 0.
35
The function γjpwq appears in the equation both inside the value function V pw; θ;σ˚; γjq and
outside of it. Taking the derivative with respect to the outside presence of γj gives:
Sout :“ Erπ˜ppj, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qq;w; θ0q ´ π˜pp1, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qq;w; θ0qq|ws ` Bγj,0PSσ˚pγq
` βpEǫ´1rV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γjq|w, pj, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qqs ´ Eǫ´1rV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γjq|w, p1, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qqsq.
Taking the derivative with respect to the inside presence gives:
Sins :“ pqpwq ´ βλpwqqB0EV pw; θ;σ˚; rpγj ´ γj,0q ` γj,0q
using the same argument as in (50). Therefore, the bias correction term is
αCCPj pD; θ; γjq :“ ´
qpwq
qpwq ´ βλpwqΓγ,jpw; θq
`
1ta1“ju ´ γjpwq
˘
,
where Γγ,jpw, θq is given by
Γγ,jpw, θq :“ Eǫ´1rπ˜ppj, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qq;w; θ0q ´ π˜pp1, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qq;w; θ0qq|ws ` Bγj,0PSσ˚pγq
` βpEǫ´1rV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γjq|w, pj, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qqs
´ Eǫ´1rV pwnext; θ;σ˚; γjq|w, p1, σ˚pw; ǫ´1qqsq.

Proof of Lemma 2. Let a be a profile of actions. Let Qpu,w, aq be the conditional quantile function
of the conditional distribution Ppwnext|w, aq defined as
Ppwnext ď Qpu,w, aq|w, aq “ u, u P r0, 1s.
Thus I treat ρpu,w, aq :“ Qpu,w, aq as the nuisance parameter instead of Ppwnext|w, aq. Let σ˜ P
tσ, σ˚u be a Markov policy. Consider the value function V pw; θ; σ˜; ηq “ V pw; θ; σ˜; ρq as a function
of ρpu,w, aq holding the other components of the nuisance parameter η fixed at the true value. By
the property of the conditional quantile function, the bias correction term αTRANSσ pD; θ; ηq is equal
to:
αTRANSσ˜ pD; θ; ηq “ Πpw; θq ¨
1twnextďρpu,w,aqu ´ u
fpwnext|w, aq ,
where fpwnext|w, aq is the conditional density of the future state wnext given the current state and
the function Πpw; θq is defined by the following equation:
B0EqpwqV pw; θ; σ˜; rpρ´ ρ0q ` ρ0q “ EΠpw; θqrρ´ ρ0s.
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I find the function Πpw; θq by the application of the implicit function theorem to the recursive
equation (5). The equation takes the form:
Eqpwq
„
V pw; θ; σ˜; ρq ´
Jÿ
j“1
Eǫ´1qpwqrπ˜ppj, σ˚´1pw, ǫ´1qq;w; θ0qs
Kź
k“1
Ppσkpw, ǫkq “ ak|wq
` PSσ˜1pwq ` β
ÿ
a1PśKk“1Ak
ErV pwnext; θ; σ˜; η0q|w, a1sPpσ˜kpw, ǫkq “ a1k|wq

“ 0.
The nuisance parameter ρ enters the equation above both inside and outside of the value function.
The derivative with respect to the outside presence of ρ takes the form:
βB0EqpwqrV prpρpunext, w, aq ´ ρ0punext, w, aqq ` ρ0punext, w, aq; θ; σ˜; η0q|w, as
Kź
k“1
Ppσ˜kpw, ǫkq “ ak|wq
“ βEqpwq∇wnextV pwnext; θ; σ˜; η0qrρpunext, w, aq ´ ρ0punext, w, aqs,
where unext is the random draw from the U r0, 1s. The derivative with respect to the inside presence
is derived using the same argument of Lemma 1 that applies regardless of the equilibrium property
of the strategy σ. The argument of Lemma 2 yields the bias correction term:
αTRANSσ pD; θ; ηq “
βqpwq
qpwq ´ βλpwqEr∇wnextV pwnext; θ; σ˜; η0q|w, as ¨
1twnextďρpu,w,aqu ´ u
fpwnext|w, aq .

Proof of Lemma 3. Fix an action j2 of player 2. Let γj2 :“ Ppσ2˚ pw, ǫ2q “ j2|wq be the conditional
probability of the choice j2 under the equilibrium strategy σ
˚
2 pw, ǫ2q of player 2. I consider the
value function V pw; θ; σ˜; ηq “ V pw; θ; σ˜; γj2q holding the other nuisance parameters fixed at their
true values. The bias correction term takes for γj,2 takes the form:
α
CCP,op
j2
pD; θ; γj2q “ Γoppw; θqp1ta2“j2u ´ γj2pwqq,
where the function Γoppw; θq is defined by the following equation:
B0EqpwqV pw; θ; σ˜; rpγj2 ´ γj2,0q ` γj2,0q “ EΓoppw; θqrγj2pwq ´ γj2,0pwqs.

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I find the function Γoppw; θq by the application of the implicit function theorem to the recursive
equation (5). In the case K “ 2 of two players (5) takes the form:
Eqpwq
„
V pw; θ; σ˜; ρq ´
A1ÿ
j1“1
A2ÿ
j2“1
π˜ppj1, j2q, w, θqPpσ˜pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wqγj2pwq
` PSσ˜1pwq ` β
A1ÿ
j1“1
A2ÿ
j2“1
ErV pwnext; θ; σ˜; η0q|w, pj1, j2qsPpσ˜pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wqγj2pwq

“ 0.
The nuisance parameter γj2pwq enters the equation above both inside and outside of the utility
function. The function γj2pwq enters linearly in its outside presence. Therefore, the derivative with
respect to the outside presence takes the form:
Eqpwq
„ A1ÿ
j1“1
`
π˜ppj1, j2q;w; θq ´ π˜ppj1, 1q;w; θq
˘
Ppσ˜pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wq`
β
A1ÿ
j1“1
`
ErV pwnext; θ; σ˜q|w, pj1, j2qs ´ ErV pwnext; θ; σ˜q|w, pj1, 1qs
˘
Ppσ˜pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wq

¨
¨ rγj,2pwq ´ γj,2,0pwqs.
The derivative with respect to the inside presence is derived using the same argument of Lemma 1
that applies regardless of the equilibrium property of the strategy σ˜ and yields the bias correction
term:
α
CCP,op
j2
pD; θ; γj2q “
qpwq
qpwq ´ βλpwq
„ A1ÿ
j1“1
`
π˜ppj1, j2q;w; θq ´ π˜ppj1, 1q;w; θq
˘
Ppσ1pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wq`
β
A1ÿ
j1“1
`
ErV pwnext; θ; σ˜q|w, pj1, j2qs ´ ErV pwnext; θ; σ˜q|w, pj1, 1qs
˘
Ppσ1pw, ǫ1q “ j1|wq

¨
¨ p1ta2“j2u ´ γj2pwqq.
Proof of Lemma 4. Suppose there exists a function Bpa,w, ζq that is the basis function of the
per-period utility function (22):
π˜pa;w; θ; ζq “ θ ¨Bpa;w; ζq.
Since ζ is an identified parameter of the distribution PD, I drop it from the notation. The value
function is a linear function of θ:
V pw; θ;σ; ηq “ Er
ÿ
tě0
βtBpσpwt, ǫtq;wtq|wsloooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooon
“:Ψ1pw,σq
¨θ ` Er
ÿ
tě0
βtǫ1,tpσ1pwt, ǫtqq|wslooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
“:Ψ2pw,σq
,
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where Ψ1pw, σq and Ψ2pw, σq are equal to the expected discounted value of the deterministic per-
period utility and the private shock, respectively. Therefore, V pw; a;σ; ηq is a linear function of θ.
The profile-specific value function
ErV pwnext; θ;σ; ηq|w, as “ Er
ÿ
tě1
βtBpσpwt, ǫtq;wtq|w0 “ w, a0 “ as ¨ θ
` Er
ÿ
tě1
βtǫ1,tpσ1pwt, ǫtqq|w0 “ w, a0 “ as
is also a linear function of θ. Therefore, the bias correction terms (33) and (35) are linear functions
of θ. The expected derivative of the value function is also a linear function of θ:
Er∇wnextV pwnext; θ;σ; ηq|w0 “ w, as “ ErBwnextΨ1pwnext, σq|w, as ¨ θ ` ErBwnextΨ2pwnext, σq|w, as.
Therefore, the bias correction term (34) is a linear function of θ. 
7 Proofs from Section 4
7.1 Auxiliary Lemmas
Lemma 8 (Basic Inequalities). The following inequalities hold for all vectors x, y P Rd:
|}x}2 ´ }y}2| ď }x´ y}}x` y}
|}x}2` ´ }y}2`| ď }x´ y}2` ` 2}x´ y}`}y}`.
Proof. The first inequality holds:
|}x}2 ´ }y}2| “ |
dÿ
j“1
px2j ´ y2j q| ď
dÿ
j“1
|xj ´ yj||xj ` yj| ď }x´ y}}x` y}.
The second inequality holds:
|}x}2` ´ }y}2`| “ |
dÿ
j“1
ppx`q2j ´ py`q2j q| “ |
dÿ
j“1
px`j ´ y`j qpx`j ` y`j q|
ď
dÿ
j“1
|px`j ´ y`j q||px`j ` y`j q “
dÿ
j“1
|px`j ´ y`j q|2 ` 2
dÿ
j“1
|px`j ´ y`j q|y`j
ď
dÿ
j“1
p|xj ´ yj|2` ` 2|xj ´ yj|`y`j q ď }x´ y}2` ` 2}x´ y}`}y}`.

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The assumptions below are the high-level assumptions on the population criterion function
Qpθ, ξq. I will prove Theorem 5 under the assumptions below. I verify these assumptions from the
conditions of Section 4 in the Subsection 7.3.
The proofs below are defined for the simple sample splitting procedure. The sample pDiqNi“1 is
decomposed into the auxiliary sample J1 and the main sample J2 of size n :“ rN{2s each. Let the
nuisance parameter pξ be constructed on the sample J1. For each ξ P Ξ define the sample criterion
function as
Qnpθ, ξq :“ } 1
n
ÿ
iPJ2
gpDi, θ, ξqxW pθq, }2`. (68)
where xW pθq is a diagonal weighting matrix that converges to a diagonal weighting matrix W pθq
with strictly positive diagonal elements.
ASSUMPTION 3 (Consistency of Qnpθ, ξ0q). (1) Regularity of Qpθ, ξ0q. The function Qpθ, ξ0q
is a non-negative lower semicontinuous function such that @ǫ ą 0, Dδpǫq ą 0 such that
inf
ΘzΘIǫ
Qpθ, ξ0q ě δpǫq ą 0. (69)
(2) Fast Convergence on ΘI . The sample loss Qnpθ, ξ0q converges to the population loss Qpθ, ξ0q
uniformly over the identified set ΘI at the rate n:
sup
ΘI
nQnpθ, ξ0q “ OP p1q. (70)
(3) Slow Convergence on Θ. The sample loss Qnpθ, ξ0q converges to the population loss Qpθ, ξ0q
uniformly over the whole set Θ in the semi-metric } ¨ }` at the rate
?
n:
sup
Θ
pQpθ, ξ0q ´Qnpθ, ξ0qq` “ OP p1{
?
nq. (71)
(4) There exist positive constants δ, κ ą 0 such that for any p P p0, 1q there exist constants dp, np
such that for any n ě np:
inf
ξp¨qPΞn
PpQnpθ, ξq ě κrdpθ,ΘIq ^ δs2 @θ : dHpθ,ΘIq ě pdp{nq1{2q ě 1´ p, (72)
where Ξn :“
Ś
θPΘ Ξ
θ
n, and Ξ
θ
n is defined in Condition 1.
ASSUMPTION 4 (No effect of the first stage estimation error). (1) Slow Convergence on Θ.
For any p ą 0 there exist constants rp, np such that @n ě np the difference of the sample losses
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Qnpθ, ξq ´ Qnpθ, ξ0q evaluated at the nuisance value ξpθq and at the true value ξ0pθq converges
uniformly over Θ at rate
?
n for any element ξpθq P Ξθn:
inf
ξp¨qPΞn
Pp?n sup
Θ
|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| ď rpq ě 1´ p.
(2) Fast Convergence on ΘI . For any p, ǫ ą 0 there exists np,ǫ such that @n ě np,ǫ the difference of
the sample losses Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q converges uniformly over ΘI for any element ξp¨q P Ξn:
inf
ξp¨qPΞn
Ppn sup
ΘI
|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| ď ǫq ě 1´ p.
ASSUMPTION 5 (Fast Convergence on the ǫn- Expansion of the Identified Set). Let ǫn “
OP pp1_pcn q1{2q be the convergence rate in Theorem 9. For any p, ǫ ą 0 there exists np,ǫ such that
@n ě np,ǫ the difference between the sample losses Qnpθ, ξq ´ Qnpθ, ξ0q converges uniformly over
ΘǫnI for any element ξ P Ξn:
inf
ξPΞn
Ppn sup
Θ
ǫn
I
|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| ď ǫq ě 1´ p.
Lemma 9 (Coverage,Consistency, and Rate of Convergence for Loss Functions). Let pc{nÑp 0 and
infξPΞn PpsupθPΘI nQnpθ, ξq ď pcq “ 1´op1q (containment ΘI Ď pΘI). Then, Assumptions 3[1-3] and
4[1] imply that ΘI Ď pΘI w.p. 1 and dHppΘI ,ΘIq “ oP p1q. Assumptions 3[1-4] and 4[1] imply that
dHppΘI ,ΘIq “ OP pp1 _ pcq{nq1{2. In the case ΘI “ Θ, Assumption 3 implies that dHppΘI ,ΘIq “ 0.
In the case Assumption 4[2] holds, pc can be chosen as pc “ OP p1q.
Lemma 10 (Concentration of Estimated Moments). W.p. Ñ 1,
sup
θPΘ
|GnrgpDi, θ, pξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs| ÀP r1n logp1{r1nq ` n´1{2`1{s log n. (73)
Lemma 11 (Sufficient Conditions for General Moment Problems). Conditions 1, 2, (41) imply
that Assumptions 4 and 5 are satisfied for the moment inequalities problem with the population
loss Qpθ, ξ0q “ }EgpWi, θ, ξ0pθqq}` and its sample analog Qnpθ, pξq “ }EngpDi, θ, pξq}`, as well as
the moment equalities problem with the population loss Qpθ, ξ0q “ }EgpDi, θ, ξ0pθqq} and its sample
analog Qnpθ, pξq “ }EngpWi, θ, pξq}.
ASSUMPTION 6 (Limit Distribution of Cn ). There exists a law C such that
PpCn ď cq Ñ PpC ď cq @c P R,
where the distribution function of C is continuous on r0,8q.
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ASSUMPTION 7 (Approximability of Cn). For any sequence of random measurable sets Θn
such that dHpΘn,ΘIq “ oP pn´1{2q, the sequence of the suprema of the sample loss over sets Θn,
C 1n :“ supθPΘn nQnpθ, ξ0q satisfies uniform convergence:
sup
cPR
|PpC 1n ď cq ´ PpC ď cq| “ op1q.
7.2 Proof of Theorems from Main Text
Proof of Theorem 5 . . Assumption 3[1] holds:
inf
ΘzΘǫI
Qpθ, ξ0q “ }EgpDi, θ, ξ0q}2` ě C2minpǫ^ δminq2 ą 0. ((38))
Assumption 3[2] holds by Lemma 8 and the P -Donsker property of gpDi, θ, ξ0pθqq:
sup
θPΘI
n}EngpDi, θ, ξ0q}2` ď sup
θPΘI
}GngpDi, θ, ξ0q}2`
` 2}GngpDi, θ, ξ0q}` }
?
nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}`looooooooooomooooooooooon
“0 by Definition of ΘI
` }?nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}2`looooooooooomooooooooooon
“0 by Definition of ΘI
ñd }∆pθq}2` “ OP p1q.
Assumption 3[3] holds by Lemma 8 and the P -Donsker property of gpDi, θ, ξ0q:
sup
θPΘ
?
n|}EgpDi, θ, ξ0q}2` ´ }EngpDi, θ, ξ0q}2`|` “ OP p1q.
Assumption 3[4] holds. Fix an amount of probability p ą 0 and let n be large enough so that
minimal eigenvalue xW is bounded below w.p.1´ p{4:
PpWnq :“ Pptλmax ě max eig xW pθq ě min eig xW pθq ě λminuq ě 1´ p{4.
By Condition 1(1)
PpBnq “ Pppξp¨q P Ξnq ě 1´ p{4,
by Lemma 10
PpFnq :“ Ppsup
θPΘ
|GngpDi, θ, pξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0q| ď Cp{4q ě 1´ p{4,
and by (41),
PpGnq :“ Pp}GngpDi, θ, ξ0q} ď Cp{4q ě 1´ p{4.
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On the event Bn XWn X Fn X Gn for n sufficiently large, nQnpθ, pξq is bounded below:
nQnpθ, pξq “ }´GngpDi, θ, pξq ` ?nEgpDi, θ, pξq¯JxW pθq}2`
ě λmin}GngpDi, θ, pξq ` ?nEgpDi, θ, pξq}2`
ě λmin}
?
nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}2`
ˆ }GngpDi, θ, ξ0q}
}?nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}2`
` }GnrgpDi, θ,
pξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs ` ?nErgpDi, θ, pξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs}
}?nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}2`
` }
?
nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}
}?nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}2`
˙
.
Consider the set
dHpθ,ΘIq ě 6Cp{4{Cmin
?
n
and np large enough so that
@n ě np,
?
nsn ă Cp{4, r1n logp1{r1nq ă Cp{4.
On this set, the following bounds apply:
}x}` :“ inf
θ:dHpθ,ΘIqě6Cp{4{Cmin
?
nq
}?nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}` ě CminpdHpθ,ΘIq ^ δminq ě 6Cp{4,
}y} :“ }GnrgpDi, θ, ξ0qs `GnrgpDi, θ, pξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs ` ?nErgpDi, θ, pξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs}
ď Cp{4 ` 2Cp{4` ď 3Cp{4.
Therefore, }x}` ě 2}y}. Plugging in x and y into the inequality below:
}x` y}`
}x}` ě 1´
}y}
}x}` ě 1´
1
2
“ 1
2
,
p}x` y}`}x}` q
2 ě 1
4
implies that }x`y}`}x}` is greater than or equal to
1
2
on the set Bn XWn X Fn X Gn for n sufficiently
large. Setting κ “ C2min{16, δ “ δmin, γ “ 1{2, κp :“ p6Cp{4{Cminq2 and n large enough implies:
inf
ξPΞn
PpQnpθ, ξq ě C2min{16rdpθ,ΘIq ^ δmins2
@θ : dHpθ,ΘIq ě 6Cp{4{Cmin
?
nq ě 1´ p.
Therefore, Assumption 3(4) holds. Lemma 11 verifies Assumption 4. 
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Proof of Lemma 6. Step 1. Let us show that the degeneracy property and the choice pc1 given in
(44) suffice for the rate OP pn´1{2q. Let pc be as in (18) and 0 ď pc1 ď pc w.p. Ñ 1. Conditionally on
the event Bn for any ξ P Ξn the following inclusion relation holds:
inf
ξPΞn
PpΘn Ď Cnppc1, ξq Ď Cnppc, ξqq ě 1´ p.
By condition (2) of the degeneracy property, dHpΘn,ΘIq “ OP pn´1{2q. It has been shown in
Theorem 5 that dHpCnppc, pξq “ OP pn´1{2q. Therefore, dHpCnppc1, pξq,ΘIq “ OP pn´1{2q conditionally
on Bn. Since PpBnq Ñ 1, the bound holds unconditionally.
Step 2.Suppose the conditions of Lemma 6 holds. Conditionally on Bn for any ξ P Ξn the
following bound holds uniformly on θ P ΘqI:
nQnpθ, ξq ď λmax}GngpWi, θ, ξq `
?
nEgpWi, θ, ξq}2` (74)
ď λmax
Lÿ
l“1
|GnglpWi, θ, ξq `
?
nEglpWi, θ, ξq|2` (75)
ď λmax
Lÿ
l“1
|op1q `OP p1q `
?
nEglpWi, θ, ξ0q|2` (76)
ď λmax
Lÿ
l“1
|op1q `OP p1q ´
?
nCpdpθ,Θ Ă ΘIq ^ δq|2. (77)
Conclude that Qnpθ, ξq “ 0 @Θ´ǫnI with ǫn :“ 2
řL
l“1 L|EngpWi, θ, ξ0q|{ 1C satisfies ǫn “ OP p1{
?
nq.
Fix any p ą 0. Since ǫn does not depend on ξ, there exists Rp and Np such that for all n ě Np
Pp?ndHpΘ´ǫnI ,ΘIq ď Rpq ě 1´ p.

Proof of Theorem 7. Assumption 4[2] implies that pc “ OP p1q satisfies the conditions of Theorem
9. Let ǫn — p log
2 n
n
q1{2 be a numerical sequence. Fix a particular subsample j and its corresponding
objective Qj,b for that subsample. Define
C¯j,b,ξ :“ sup
θPΘǫnI
bQj,bpθ, ξq
and
Cj,b,ξ :“ inf
KPKn
sup
θPK
bQj,bpθ, ξq,
where Kn “ tΘn : dHpΘn,Θq ď ǫnu is closed set of all fixed(non-random) sets within Hausdorff
distance ǫn of ΘI . Since Kn is a closed set, there exists a set Θ
˚
b where the infimum above is
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achieved:
Cj,b,ξ :“ inf
KPKn
sup
θPK
bQj,bpθ, ξq “ sup
θPΘ˚
b
bQj,bpθ, ξq.
By Lemma 9(c), for any p ą 0 there exists nAp such that @n ě nAp pc ă ǫn holds with probability at
least 1´ p:
PpAnq : “ Pppc ă ǫnq ě 1´ p.
Therefore, on the event An for any ξ P Ξθn the following inequality holds:
Cj,b,ξ ď pCj,b :“ sup
θPCnppc,ξq bQj,bpθ, ξq ď C¯j,b,ξ.
By Assumption 1, for p ą 0 there exists nBp such that @n ě nBp
PpBnq :“ Pppξ P Ξθnq ě 1´ p.
Define the event
Dǫ,ξ :“ t sup
θPΘǫnI
b|Qj,bpθ, ξq ´Qj,bpθ, ξ0q| ď ǫu
By Assumption 5, for p, ǫ ą 0 there exists nDp,ǫ such that @n ě nDp,ǫ and any ξ P Ξn the event
Dǫ,ξ hold with probability at least 1´ 2p (i.e, PpDp,pξ X Bnq ě 1´ 2p).
On the event An X Bn XDp,pξ for n ě nAp _ nBp _ nDp,ǫ,
Cj,b,ξ0 ´ ǫ ďi Cj,b,pξ ďii pCj,b :“ sup
θPCnppc,pξq
bQj,bpθ, pξq ďiii C¯j,b,pξ ďiv C¯j,b,ξ0 ` ǫ,
where i and iv hold by definition of D
p,pξ and the property of supremum; ii and iii hold by definition
of the event An and Bn. Denote
pGpξpxq :“ 1Bn
Bnÿ
j“1
1t pC
j,b,pξďxu, G¯pxq :“
1
Bn
Bnÿ
j“1
1tCj,b,ξ0ďxu
, Gpxq :“ 1
Bn
Bnÿ
j“1
1tC¯j,b,ξ0ďxu.
Since
pC
j,b,pξ ď C¯j,b,ξ0 ` ǫ
the event C¯j,b,ξ0 ď x ´ ǫ implies pCj,b ď x. Therefore, 1Bn řBnj“1 1t pCj,b,pξďxu ě 1Bn řBnj“1 1tC¯j,b,ξ0ďx´ǫu,
and using the notation above, I get:
Gpx´ ǫq ď pGpξpxq.
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Similar argument gives:
Gpx´ ǫq ď pGpξpxq ď G¯px` ǫq.
Step 2 shows that continuity of the c.d.f of PpC ď xq (Assumption 6) implies that
Gpx´ ǫq Ñp PpC ď x´ ǫq Ñ PpC ď xq, bÑ 8
and
G¯px` ǫq Ñp PpC ď x` ǫq Ñ PpC ď xq, bÑ8.
Step 2. Consider the function
hpW1,W2, ..,Wnq :“ 1
Bn
Bnÿ
j“1
1tC¯j,b,ξ0ďx´ǫu.
Let us show that hp¨q has bounded differences: replacement of observation Wk by W 1k changes at
most one subsample j and results in at most a 1
Bn
change in the function itself.
|hpW1,Wk, ..,Wnq ´ hpW1,W 1k, ..,Wnq| ď
1
Bn
.
McDiarmid’s inequality implies:
sup
ǫPR
Pp|Gpx´ ǫq ´ EGpx´ ǫq| ą tq ď 2 exp´2t2B2n{n :“ δ
Gpx´ ǫq “ EGpx´ ǫq `OP pplog 2
δ
q1{2
?
n
Bn
q
uniformly over ǫ ą 0. Since the subsamples j1 ‰ j2 are i.i.d,
EGpx´ ǫq “ PpC¯j,b,ξ0 ď x´ ǫq.
Step 3. By Assumption 7,
|PpC¯j,b,ξ0 ď x´ ǫq ´ PpC ď xq| ď sup
xPR
|PpC¯j,b,ξ0 ď xq ´ PpC ď xq| ( Assumption 7)
` |PpC ď x´ ǫq ´ PpC ď xq| (Continuity of Cν0)
“ op1q (78)
as nÑ 8, bÑ8. Since the bound above holds for any ǫ ą 0, the statement is proved. To conclude, I
have shown that G¯px`ǫq “ P pC ď cq`oP p1q. Similarly, I can show that Gpx´ǫq “ P pC ď cq`oP p1q.
Since P pC ď cq is continuous in c, the α- quantile of pGpξpxq converges to the α-quantile of C. 
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7.3 Proof of Auxiliary Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 9. The proof relies on the following basic inequalities. For any set Θ and two
functions ppθq, qpθq the following holds:
sup
θPΘ
ppθq ď sup
θPΘ
qpθq ` sup
θPΘ
pppθq ´ qpθqq` (79)
inf
θPΘ
ppθq ě inf
θPΘ
qpθq ´ sup
θPΘ
pqpθq ´ ppθqq`. (80)
Consider a sequence of events Bn :“ tpξp¨q P Ξnu whose probability approaches one:
PpBnq “ 1´ op1q.
Step 1. On an event Bn
Pp sup
θPΘI
nQnpθ, pξq ď pc|Bnq ě inf
ξPΞn
Pp sup
θPΘI
nQnpθ, ξq ď pcq “ 1´ op1q,
which implies
PpΘI Ă pΘI |Bnq “ 1´ op1q.
Since PpBnq “ 1´ op1q, with probability approaching one PpΘI Ă pΘIq holds.
Step 2. Proof of convergence without guaranteed rate. Fix an ǫ ą 0. Let us show that
PpdHppΘI ,ΘIq ď ǫq Ñ 1.
By Assumption 3 (Equation (69)), there exists δpǫq such that
inf
ΘzΘIǫ
Qpθ, ξ0q ě δpǫq ą 0.
To see that PppΘI Ă ΘI ǫq “ 1´op1q, recognize that on the event Bn conditionally on the subsample
J1:
suppΘI
Qpθ, ξ0q ď suppΘI
Qnpθ, ξ0q ` suppΘI
pQpθ, ξ0q ´Qnpθ, ξ0qq` (Eq. (79))
ď suppΘI
Qnpθ, ξ0q `OP p1{
?
nq (Eq. (71))
ď suppΘI
Qnpθ, pξpθqq ` suppΘI pQnpθ, ξ0q ´Qnpθ, pξqq` `OP p1{
?
nq (Eq. (79))
ď pc{n`OP p1{?n` 1{?nq “ oP p1q (Assumption 4 and the choice of pc)
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Since suppΘI Qpθ, ξ0q ă ǫ2 ñ pΘI Ă ΘIǫ, PppΘI Ă ΘIǫq “ 1´ op1q.
Step 3. Proof of convergence at rate ǫn :“ pdp{3κ_pcnκ q1{2. Fix a probability level p P p0, 1q and let
the constants κ, δ be as specified in Assumption 3(Equation (72)). I have to show:
@p ą 0 Ddp, np : @n ě np PpdHppΘI ,ΘIq ď ǫnq ě 1´ p.
Since pc{nÑp 0, there exists nAp{3 such that for a sufficiently large n : n ě nAp{3,
PpAnq :“ Pppc{pnκq ă pδ{2q2q “ 1´ p{3.
By the definition of pξpθq, for a sufficiently large n : n ě nB
p{3,
PpBnq :“ Pppξp¨q P Ξnq ě 1´ p{3.
Define a set
Dpξ :“ t inf
θ:dH pθ,ΘIqěǫn
nQnpθ, pξq ě nκpǫn ^ δq2u
Since ǫn ě pdp{3{nq1{2 holds absolutely surely by the choice of ǫn, Assumption 3[4] implies that for
n ě np{3:
PpDpξ|Bnq ě infξPΞn Pp infθ:dH pθ,ΘIqěǫn nQnpθ, ξq ě nκpǫn ^ δq
2q ě 1´ p{3.
Therefore, for a sufficiently large n : n ě nA
p{3,
inf
θ:dH pθ,ΘIqěǫn
nQnpθ, pξq ě nκpǫn ^ δq2 ñ (81)
inf
θ:dH pθ,ΘIqěǫn
nQnpθ, pξq ě nκǫ2n “ dpκ_ pc ě pc.
Therefore, for a sufficiently large n : n ě np{3 _ nAp{3 _ nBp{3,
Pp inf
θ:dHpθ,ΘIqěǫn
nQnpθ, pξq ě κpǫn ^ δq2|Bnq (82)
ě inf
ξPΞn
Pp inf
θ:dH pθ,ΘIqěǫn
nQnpθ, ξq ě κpǫn ^ δq2q.
Combining (82) and (81) gives
Pp inf
θ:dH pθ,ΘIqěǫn
nQnpθ, pξq ě κpǫn ^ δq2 X Bn XAnq
ě 1´ PppBnqcq ` PppAnqcq ` PppDpξqcq
ě 1´ pp{3` p{3` p{3q.
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Since PpsuppΘI nQnpθ, pξq ď pcq “ 1 ´ op1q, this implies that PppΘI Ă ΘǫnI q “ 1 ´ op1q. By Step 1, I
conclude that dHppΘI ,ΘIq “ OP pǫnq.
Step 4. That pc “ OP p1q satisfies the conditions of Lemma 9, follows from
sup
θPΘI
nQnpθ, ξq ď sup
θPΘI
nQnpθ, ξ0q ` sup
θPΘI
n|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q|
ď OP p1q ` sup
θPΘI
n|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| (Assumption 3[2])
ď OP p1q ` oP p1q (Assumption 4[2])
for any ξ P Ξn.

Proof of Lemma 10. Conditionally on the auxiliary sample, pξp¨q can be treated as fixed, and w.p.
approaching one, pξp¨q P Ξn. Consider the function class:
F2 “ tglpDi, θ, pξq ´ glpDi, θ, ξ0q, l “ 1, 2, .., L, θ P Θu Ă Fpξ ´Fξ0 .
Let a function F2 :“ Fpξ ` Fξ0 be the envelope function for the class F2. This function satisfies
the envelope requirements of Lemma 6.2 of Chernozhukov et al. (2017a) since }F2}P,q ď }Fpξ}P,q `
}Fξ0}P,q ď 2C1 and
log sup
Q˜
Npǫ}F2}Q,2,F2, } ¨ }Q˜,2q ď 2v logp2a{ǫq.
On the event Bn,
sup
θPΘ
ErgjpDi, θ, pξq ´ gjpDi, θ, ξ0qs2 ď sup
θPΘ,ξPΞn
E}rgjpDi, θ, ξpθqq ´ gjpDi, θ, ξ0qs}2
ď pr1nq2
The application of Lemma 6.2 of Chernozhukov et al. (2017a) conditionally on the auxiliary sample,
with the function class F2, envelope F2, and σ
2 :“ ?n12 yields:
sup
fPF
|GnrgpDi, θ, pξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs|
ÀP r1n log1{2p1{r1nq ` n´1{2`1{s log n “ oP p1q (83)

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Proof of Lemma 11. Let the events Wn,Bn,Fn,Gn be as defined at in the Proof of Theorem 5. The
application of Lemma 8 on the event Wn X Bn X Fn X Gn gives:
|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| “ |}EngpDi, θ, pξqxW pθqloooooooooomoooooooooon
x
}2` ´ }EngpDi, θ, ξ0qxW pθqlooooooooooomooooooooooon
y
}2`|
ď }x´ y}2` ` 2}x´ y}`}y}`.
The terms }x´ y}` and }y}` admit the following bound:
}x´ y}` “ }EnrgpDi, θ, ξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qsxW pθq}
ď λmax}ErgpDi, θ, ξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs `GnrgpDi, θ, ξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs{
?
n}
ď λmaxpsn ` pr1n logp1{r1nq ` n´1{2`1{sqq,
}y}` “ }GngpDi, θ, ξ0q{
?
n` EgpDi, ξ0q}`.
Therefore, Assumption 4(a) holds, and
rp “ p2λmaxCp{4q2 ` 2λmaxCp{42pCp{4 ` sup
θPΘ
}EgpDi, θ, ξ0q}q
satisfies
inf
ξPΞn
Pp?n sup
Θ
|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| ď rpq ě 1´ p.
and for n large enough supθPΘI }Cp{4 `
?
nEgpDi, θ, ξ0q}` “ 0, r1p “ p2λmaxCp{4{q2
inf
ξPΞn
Ppn sup
ΘI
|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| ď r1pq ě 1´ p.
If Assumption 3(2) holds,
sup
ΘǫI
n|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| ď n}x´ y}2` ` 2n}x´ y}`}y}`
?
n}x´ y}` “ }
?
nEnrgpDi, θ, ξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qsxW pθq}
ď λmax}
?
nErgpDi, θ, ξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs `GnrgpDi, θ, ξq ´ gpDi, θ, ξ0qs}
ď λmaxp
?
nsn ` r1n logp1{r1nq ` n´1{2`1{sq “ op1q.
?
n}y}` “ }GngpDi, θ, ξ0q `
?
nEgpDi, ξ0q}`
sup
θPΘǫn
I
?
n}y}` ď Cp{4 `
?
nǫn ď Cp{4 `OP p1q.
Therefore, for any ǫ, p ą 0 for n sufficiently large
inf
ξPΞn
Ppsup
Θ
ǫn
I
n|Qnpθ, ξq ´Qnpθ, ξ0q| ď ǫq ě 1´ p.

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